

CURRENT HISTORY

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
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November, 1982

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Current History

OCTOBER, 1982

VOL. 81, NO. 477

How is the Soviet Union preparing to face the challenges of the last years of the twentieth century? How stable is the Soviet-American balance of power? Our introductory article notes that "in a very real sense, Washington's [current] posture has pulled the rug out from under arms control advocates The basic question is whether the administration will decide to revert to MAD [the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction], with all its ramifications, or whether it will persist in its contrary embrace of NUTS (nuclear utilization theories) logic."

Soviet-American Policy: New Strategic Uncertainties

BY CARL G. JACOBSEN

Director of Soviet Studies, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami

PRESIDENT Ronald Reagan's arms policies not only challenge Moscow's strategic posture; they also strike at the premises that have governed Western military-political discourse since the late 1960's. In the process they are precipitating both an East-West crisis and a crisis within NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). The former deserves primary attention.

The stability of the United States-Soviet balance of power is increasingly questioned. Debate has centered on the potency of the latest generation of Soviet land missiles, on the first strike potentials of the United States MX missiles, and on the possibility that new technologies might one day allow for truly effective ballistic missile defense systems. But the immediate question and challenge focus elsewhere, on the Barents and Arctic Seas. It is developments in this region that will decide whether Mutual Assured Destruction, MAD (the ability of each nation to destroy the aggressor even after having absorbed a first strike), will remain a sine qua non of the balance, or whether it will soon suffer the fate of the Maginot and Siegfried lines of World War II. The analysis that follows will, perforce, begin with a background description of the

region's evolving importance for Moscow's strategic posture.*

It was towards the end of World War II that Soviet Foreign Minister V. Molotov first confirmed the region's crucial importance to the Soviet Union. In a discussion with Norwegian Foreign Minister (and later United Nations Secretary General) Trygve Lie, he pointed to the ease with which the Soviet exit from the Baltic and Black Seas could be blocked, and affirmed that threats to the remaining northern sea route would therefore not be tolerated. Other Soviet spokesmen concurred: "The Kola inlet is necessary to the state."¹

The area was in fact soon to become ever more vital to Soviet security. The core rationales for the 1961 upgrading of the Soviet Navy concentrated attention on northern waters. The first reason lay in the strategic defensive need to counter the threat posed, initially, by United States carrier-borne fighter bombers and, later, by Polaris submarines. Because of that threat, Soviet antiship air, surface and subsurface reach had to be extended, and so did ASW (antisubmarine warfare) prowess and coverage.

The second reason derived from Moscow's realization of the fact that her early missiles were faulty and vulnerable. We now know that realistically less than a handful could ever have been expected to land on target, that it would have taken at least a week and probably longer to get them fueled and off the ground, and that their non-mobile above-ground

*Based on a presentation by this author to the May, 1982, Pugwash Symposium on Northern Security Problems, convened in Oslo, Norway. Conference proceedings will be published in a volume edited jointly by Pugwash and SIPRI.

¹C. G. Jacobsen, *Soviet Strategy-Soviet Foreign Policy* (Glasgow: The University Press, 1972), 2d ed., 1974, chapter 6.

launch pads would in the meantime tempt hostile bomber commands. The early 1960's, therefore, saw Soviet priority directed to the task of ensuring survivability. The effort to procure a so-called second strike force took many forms, from the construction of a crude ballistic missile defense system to experiments with mobile missiles. But the most important element was the deployment of a Soviet SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) force.

All early SLBM's, however, were limited in range. Thus Polaris firing locales had to be close to Soviet waters, and a Soviet counter needed access to areas near the continental United States. The Polaris threat could move through Allied-controlled waters, supported by facilities in Greenland, Iceland, Britain and Norway. Moscow's counter had to brave ocean reaches and passageways dominated by NATO's antisubmarine warfare potential.

Therefore, Moscow had to circumvent the United States potential. Two courses were followed.² The first was to pioneer Arctic transit routes. The 1960's saw the initiation of a dramatic Soviet program to expand Soviet knowledge of Arctic regions and phenomena. By 1967, Soviet researchers were able and authorized to release tectonic (structural) maps of the Arctic ocean floor, going right across to Canada's northern islands; these maps were better than those of the best analogous Canadian maps of some of the islands' land areas. Moscow's Arctic effort was equally impressive in the fields of chemical oceanography, water salinity, temperature and oxygen measurements, water biological and aerial aeromagnetic data gathering, gravity charts, and ice dynamics investigations. By the early 1970's, the Arctic Ocean was in the process of becoming an extension of Soviet "home waters."³

The second development of the 1960's decade lay in the pioneering of longer-range SLBM's. The first Delta-class boats, with intercontinental range missiles that could be fired from Soviet territorial seas, were deployed toward the end of 1972. This new mainstay of Moscow's second-strike force dispensed with the need to brave or circumvent hostile ASW-infested waters; the boats could be held in areas controlled and protected by Soviet ASW potential. And if these areas appeared constricted or threatened, the boats could find refuge and firing locales in familiar Arctic reaches. We now know that Delta vessels were in fact

constructed to facilitate surfacing (and firing) through certain ice thicknesses.

The early 1970's brought new considerations. Missile numbers constituted one point of departure. On both sides, initial numbers had of necessity been oriented to city-targeting to maximize their deterrent impact. Increased numbers led first to redundancy targeting, intended to offset the uncertain arrival-on-target prospects of first-generation missiles, and later to targeting on non-urban industrial complexes and larger military concentrations (from production facilities to ports and airfields). By 1968, United States Senate testimony acknowledged that 40 United States warheads had been assigned to every Soviet city of consequence; it was becoming clear that the saturation coverage of "strategic" targets had been achieved.

The extent of saturation redundancy was at the same time being mocked by the newly realized phenomenon of fratricide. Fratricide, the probability that the first incoming explosion would itself incapacitate follow-up warheads, voided previous concepts of multiple targeting. But multiple targeting was in any case becoming less necessary, with the development of a new generation of missiles that were far more reliable and far more accurate.

There thus emerged an extraordinary surplus of Soviet and American warheads. And most strategists considered the surplus to be far greater than could be justified by even the most ludicrously exaggerated postulates of enemy strike potential. With reductions judged politically inopportune, there were really only two alternatives.⁴ One, embraced by the United States, lay in the tactical employment of strategic weapons. American preference can be traced from the Schlesinger Doctrine of 1972-1974 (enunciated by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger), through the Carter administration's Presidential Directive 59, to the early Reagan administration's focus on "limited" strategic nuclear-war scenarios and options.


The alternate justification rested on the development of strategic reserves that need not be utilized for first, second, third, or fourth strike purposes, but could be kept for interwar bargaining and war termination leverage. For Moscow, during the early 1970's, this became the sole purpose. This was partly because the Soviet Union continued to produce and store fewer missiles than the United States. More important, Moscow had not yet mastered the accuracy technologies on which American predilections were predicated.

It took another decade before Moscow could match the accuracy proficiencies of the United States arsenal of the early and mid-1970's. And by then United States technology had progressed still further: the Pershing II "theater-nuclear" missiles had six times the kill probability against hardened targets of the otherwise comparable Soviet SS-20's (though the difference was now rapidly becoming less significant).

²C. G. Jacobsen, *Soviet Strategic Initiatives; Challenge and Response* (New York: Praeger, 1979), chapter 2, especially the section on naval withholding strategy.

³*Ibid.*; see also this author's *Soviet Strategic Interests and Canada's Northern Sovereignty*, Canadian Department of National Defense ORAE E-M Paper, no. 4, 1978; and Willy Østreng, *Soviet I Nordlige Farvann*, Gyldendal, Oslo, 1982.

⁴For further elaboration of these arguments, see C. G. Jacobsen, *The Nuclear Era: Its History; Its Implications* (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1982), chapter 3.



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Moscow thus concentrated through the 1970's on securing the sanctity and nonviolability of the Barents Sea and adjacent Arctic waters. From the mid-1970's onward this area was supplemented by the development of a second protected withholding locale in the Far East, the Sea of Okhotsk. But the security of the Northern Fleet remained paramount. The early 1980's still saw 70 percent of Moscow's SLBM fleet in the north (with the remainder allocated to the Far Eastern fallback locale).⁵

As the years wore on, however, and more Deltas came on line, the Barents became subject to a degree of congestion. Larger SLBM numbers logically led to even greater stress on the Arctic extensions of home water basins. The incorporation of the Arctic Ocean as part and parcel of Moscow's withholding corral, or fortress, had been an ongoing process, and the amalgam of Soviet Arctic familiarization efforts had long been extraordinary. In Arctic reaches, United States attack designs would have to do with less than the formidable array of supportive underwater devices that would facilitate similar endeavors in Atlantic, North Sea and Norwegian waters, and they could not

call on the requisite complement of surface and air support. In the context of Moscow's unique store of Arctic knowledge and the immense acreage involved (ice-free openings within the Arctic ice cap alone added up to an area the size of the Caspian Sea, and this was only a fraction of the operational acreage conjured up by Moscow's noted submarine construction emphasis on through-ice potentials),⁶ the Soviet Union had reason to believe that withheld force elements could not be significantly degraded.

The securing of an ocean haven within which SLBM forces could operate with scant fear of substantive assault was, of course, in perfect accord with the traditionally accepted tenets of MAD. The military (as opposed to the psychological) relevance of withholding concepts was dismissed by most analysts, who remained convinced that real-life wartime dynamics would propel initial exchanges to the point where little but rubble would be left to the presumed arbiters of a post-exchange world. The military consensus thus saw withholding potential as little more than redundant second-strike forces. The argument hence reverted to the generally accepted postulate that *de facto* (enemy) ASW-free zones constituted a necessary condition for a stable balance. As long as true superiority was deemed impossible for reasons of technology and

⁵*Ibid.*⁶Ostreng, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

finance, and as long as the best possible deterrent available was thought to lie in mutual recognition that an attack would equal suicide (MAD), then it was clear that one's prime obligation lay in making sure that the opponent entertained no doubt about the survival of his retaliatory forces. It was precisely such potential doubt that was thought to constitute the gravest danger of war. It was vital that neither side entertain the fear that holding back might jeopardize second-strike force survival. The premium on initiating action was one that the world could not afford.

Moscow's procurement of a de facto ASW-free zone, complementing a similar privilege long enjoyed (though seldom acknowledged) by the United States Navy, thus appeared to solidify the equality corollary implicit in the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiations of the 1970's. It appeared to cement MAD and hence to constitute a positive point of departure for arms control and arms reductions talks premised on MAD. But at the same time the fundamental assumption of equality and the fundamental premise of MAD were being eroded.

The administration of President Ronald Reagan professed to see actual or imminent Soviet superiority and proceeded to order a quantum leap in United States military procurement programs. The case for Soviet superiority appeared dubious to most outside experts, including former luminaries of the State Department's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and most former members of Republican and Democratic National Security Councils.⁷ The case was glaring in some of its omissions.

Moscow's advantage was, for example, said to derive in part from the fact that Soviet missiles tend to be "heavier" and to carry more megatonnage than their American counterparts. Yet the United States was always free to build "heavy" missiles (until Washington chose to forego the prerogative, during SALT I negotiations). The point is, of course, that American warhead miniaturization and guidance-accuracy technologies made nonsense of advocacies of size. Accuracy alone is vastly more important than yield. A 50 percent improvement in a missile's probable accuracy, from an average target proximity of say 500 yards to 250 yards, has the same target impact effect as an eight-fold increase in yield. Soviet technological inferiority forced Moscow to pursue the wasteful route of yield increases. The United States enjoyed the luxury of being able to choose more cost-efficient options. By the early 1980's Soviet accuracies had greatly improved, but American

superiority still remained manifest (note above comparison of Pershing II and SS-20 kill probabilities).

A more important argument rested squarely on the improvements in Soviet accuracy potential and on the fear that Moscow might come to believe it could "take out" United States land-based missiles. Quite apart from the point that the United States would in any case retain awesomely redundant (and now precision-targetable) overkill potential aboard bombers and submarines, the fact is that even this limited vulnerability specter is highly dubious. Missile gyros and accelerometers have been tuned to test-range gravitational and atmospheric conditions that necessarily differ from those to be encountered over wartime trajectories, and satellite-derived data cannot fully compensate for resultant discrepancies. Nobody knows what deviation this will entail. The difference will not suffice to affect city targeting. But even a minimal difference will have a major effect on silo-busting aspirations.

Soviet test accuracies were in any case no more impressive than those achieved by the United States a decade earlier, and long since deployed. Yet Soviet basing patterns have not changed. The Soviet Union continues to keep a far larger portion of its nuclear forces on land than does the United States. One is compelled to conclude that Moscow views theoretical accuracy computations and the scenarios that they suggest with extreme scepticism. The suggestion that it would stake its survival on such scenarios is therefore not credible.

At "non-strategic" levels, assertions of Soviet superiority hinged on the prowess of Moscow's new intermediate-range missiles in Europe (the SS-20) and the size of the Soviet Navy. Here also the frame of reference tended to be rather selective. The Soviet Navy had indeed become far more impressive over the years. But the crude numbers game failed to distinguish between capital ships and lesser vessels. In terms of tonnage and the ability to sustain distant operations, the United States retains a two-to-one advantage. American carriers alone carry more "interventionary power" than can be mustered by Fleet Admiral Gorshkov—and this statement ignores the potency of the additional supercarriers ordered by the Reagan administration, to which we shall return.

(Continued on page 336)

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⁷See for example *Arms Control Today*, the monthly newsletter of the United States Arms Control Association; also see George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, spring, 1982; and this author's "The President's Arms Posture: Sins of Omission," to be published by the Bertrand Russell Foundation's *END Papers* series, late summer/early fall, 1982.

"Most Americans are unaware that the Soviet Union is the world's leading producer of two of the three major sources of energy, and soon will be the largest producer of the third source as well."

The Soviet Energy Pipeline

BY MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

Associate Director, Russian Research Center, Harvard University

MOST Americans believe that the Soviet Union has a serious energy problem. In a sense that is true. Undoubtedly Soviet leaders would like to have more petroleum and coal. Moreover, Soviet consumers are afflicted by periodic shortages and brownouts. But except for Saudi Arabia, there are few countries in the world that do not have an energy problem of some sort. Consequently, when evaluating the Soviet Union's energy situation, it would be more appropriate to consider the Soviet Union's energy endowment relative to that of the rest of the world. On that basis, despite some obvious shortcomings, the Soviet Union is fortunate.

American perceptions of the Soviet Union's energy difficulties have been largely shaped by a study released by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in April, 1977. Originally an in-house report not intended for the general public, the CIA's analysis was drawn up for use by President Jimmy Carter for a major energy statement. In an effort to demonstrate the gravity of the worldwide energy crisis, President Carter attempted to balance all the sources of supply against all the new demands likely to arise in the years ahead. CIA analysts had concluded that at the then level of Soviet consumption and exploration, the Soviet Union and its allies in East Europe would find themselves importing from 3.5 million to 4.5 million barrels a day (MBD) (175 million–225 million tons a year) by 1985. Since the Soviet Union in 1977 was an exporter of 3 MBD (150 million tons) of which about 1.5 MBD went to its allies in East Europe, the effect of the Soviet switch from being an exporter to being an importer would mean a net increase in non-Communist world needs of 5–6.5 MBD (250 million to 325 million tons) that would have to be provided by someone else. Since Saudi Arabia, the world's largest exporter, was then producing only about 9.2 MBD, this implied that the continued increase in Soviet consumption, combined with a fall in Soviet production, would have a major impact on the outside world.

Because the findings of the study were so significant, the CIA came under pressure to make its study public. And even though the CIA has subsequently revised its

April, 1977, study several times to show that the Soviet energy situation is not nearly so serious as the CIA originally implied, the general perception persists that Soviet problems are monumental in scale, with enormous potential for economic and political disruption, both inside and outside the Soviet Union. Even Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger continues to warn that:

With the Soviets becoming an energy importing nation in the next few years, the worry is that they would move down through Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan to try to seize the oil fields.¹

While there is little doubt that the Soviet Union might someday make a move in Iran, Iraq or other Middle East oil fields (after all, the Russians have already made their move in Afghanistan, although not because of the energy to be found in Afghanistan), such moves are more likely to be made for political reasons, not because the Soviet Union has run out of petroleum or natural gas. But the prevailing impression, even for the Secretary of Defense, continues to be that the Soviet Union has a serious energy problem.

The general perception is nonetheless incorrect. Most Americans are unaware that the Soviet Union is the world's leading producer of two of the three major sources of energy, and soon will be the largest producer of the third source as well. Thus, as regards petroleum, the most important hydrocarbon, the Soviet Union produced over 12 MBD (609 million tons) of petroleum in 1981. Production in 1982 continued to increase at about 1 percent. In contrast, in early 1982, Saudi Arabia, the country most Americans think of as being the world's largest producer, lowered its production to about 7 MBD (350 million tons). Although this drop in production was designed to reduce the size of an apparent oil glut that pushed oil prices down in early 1982, the Saudis would probably never have produced much more than 10.5 MBD in any one year, even if they were to resume their former level of production. United States output in 1980 and 1981 was about 10 MBD, also less than the Soviet Union's output. Thus the Soviet Union remains the world's largest producer of petroleum.

The Soviet Union displaced the United States as the world's largest producer of petroleum sometime in

¹*The New York Times*, February 8, 1981, p. A-13.

1974, three years before the release of the CIA report. The original CIA report assumed that by 1985 Soviet production would be in the 8-10 MBD (400 million-500 million tons) range. That assumed a drop of about .5 to 2.5 MBD in output from Soviet production levels in 1977. However, as Soviet output continued to increase, the CIA revised its production estimates. It now predicts that the Soviet Union's petroleum output in 1985 will range between 10-11 MBD (500 million-550 million tons). That still involves a drop in production of 1 MBD. In contrast, Soviet planners have set a target of 630 metric tons (12.6 MBD) for 1985. While output may not rise quite that high, neither is it likely to fall as much as the CIA now predicts. For that matter, the CIA never envisaged that Soviet output would reach a level of 600 million tons (12 MBD).

The energy source that both the CIA and the Soviets are most confident about is natural gas. While the Soviet Union still produces less natural gas than the United States (465 billion cubic meters for the Soviet Union versus 515 billion cubic meters for the United States in 1981), it is more than likely that Soviet output will meet the planned target for 1985 of 630 billion cubic meters. The Russians are increasing their output of natural gas by about 7 percent a year. They have about 34-40 percent of the world's reserves. Their main constraint is finding enough pipe.

All of this is not to deny that the Soviets have serious problems. Coal production, even though it exceeded American production in 1980 (716 million tons versus 704 million tons for the United States), has since fallen. Although output has leveled off and even increased slightly in 1982, there is little doubt that the Soviet Union will not be able to achieve the planned target of 775 million tons in 1985. This is disappointing since the Russians had hoped to substitute coal for oil for use in boilers. Their program for nuclear power construction is also behind schedule. In addition, they have not found any new major petroleum fields, which will be needed if they are to sustain oil production in the decades ahead.

Their exploration efforts are hampered in part by the fact that their equipment is outdated. For example, they find it difficult to drill below 3,000 meters. This eliminates substantial reserves. In addition, until just recently they have lacked the equipment necessary to drill in deep or icy offshore areas. Moreover, Soviet refining facilities are outmoded so that much of what they refine is poorly processed and thus ends up as a low-quality refined product. With better technology, the crude oil the Russians process could be utilized much more effectively. Finally, they continue to be wasteful in the utilization of all energy forms.

While the Soviet Union has significant shortcomings, most of its problems stem from inefficient use of Soviet resources, a lack of innovation and generally poor management. These are not problems that can

be solved overnight, but they are solvable. Most of the countries in the Western world would be happy to have such difficulties. In contrast, Western problems are primarily geological: the hydrocarbons are just not there.

Given their resource endowment, the Soviet leaders seem well able to satisfy their domestic and probably even their external energy needs. Even if Soviet output should level off or fall, output is not likely to fall enough to necessitate massive imports. The first alternative would be to replace oil consumption with gas consumption. Measures of this sort are already well under way. While it would be helpful if coal could also be used for that purpose, there is a better chance that nuclear energy output will eventually increase enough to accommodate some of the increased demand for energy. Originally, Soviet leaders hoped that by 1985, 15 percent and, by 1980, 25 percent of the country's electricity would be generated by nuclear power. The precise timetable will probably not be realized, but ultimately Soviet nuclear power will probably reach such levels. Moreover, because they recognize that electrical energy constitutes a relatively small share of all energy demand, Soviet planners are also moving to increase the share of domestic heat that is produced by nuclear energy. The steam produced by nuclear reactors will be sent through district heating facilities to heat a city's apartments and office buildings. This means that the nuclear reactors must be located relatively near a population center to prevent the steam from being dissipated through the steam pipes before it reaches the radiators it is intended to warm. As more and more of these plants are built, they may pose safety hazards, because they will be located nearer to population centers than most nuclear energy plants. So far, however, this has not stirred up any protests in the Soviet Union.

For that matter, there is no public Soviet anti-nuclear lobby. There can be no organization in the Soviet Union that is not officially sanctioned by the government. Because the government has placed a high priority on the building of nuclear facilities, it will be difficult to find any government unit that would be likely to oppose such actions. Besides, the Soviet press frequently boasts that Soviet scientists would not build any facility that is unsafe; since they are engaged in building not only a massive electrical network based on nuclear energy but also a heating network, these facilities by definition must be safe. This is accepted despite the fact that a Soviet-built nuclear energy facility in Finland has developed a crack and that until the accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, Soviet nuclear reactors were seldom built with containment vessels around them. Nonetheless, so far and probably for some time the Soviets need not worry about fending off anti-nuclear environmental groups.

AVOIDING WASTE

So far, we have been considering the prospects for building up the Soviet energy supply. There is also enormous potential on the demand side. The Soviet economy has been very wasteful handling all Soviet resources, not just energy. For many years, including the late 1970's, Soviet planners found that it takes more than a 1 percent increase in energy consumption to stimulate a 1 percent increase in gross national product (GNP). Most countries in the West have discovered that they can generate a 1 percent increase in GNP with less than a 1 percent increase in energy consumption; in other words, in the West, the energy elasticity is less than one.

Such waste in the Soviet Union is a result of a variety of factors. In part it reflects a general attitude that the Soviet Union is so large that raw materials are available if Soviet geologists look hard enough. As recently as 1974, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev spoke of the "inexhaustible resources of the Soviet Union." For that reason, the price of all raw materials, but particularly energy raw materials, was seldom changed. Thus the wholesale price of raw materials was held constant from 1967 to January, 1982, a period of 15 years. Simultaneously, however, labor and capital costs were increased. Inevitably, factory managers put more of their efforts into conserving labor and capital than into saving raw materials; in effect, the Soviet wholesale price system put a premium on wasting raw material.

In addition, in order to qualify for production bonuses, Soviet factory managers had to increase the value of their gross output measured in rubles. This was called the *val* method of production incentives. Soviet managers quickly realized that there were several ways to increase the ruble value of their output (the *val*). The intended way was to produce more goods. Another way, however, was to buy greater quantities as well as more expensive raw material inputs. If the inputs were more expensive, the outputs would also be increased in value. Indeed, it was possible to increase the gross output value in rubles even though the factory produced fewer goods. Inevitably, this resulted in needless waste.

The failure to increase wholesale prices more than once each 15 years and the use of the *val* method do not reflect basic tenets of Marxism, which allows for more frequent price changes and other forms of incentive systems. It would make an intriguing experiment to see what kinds of incentives and price systems would have evolved if communism had come to a country like Japan or Switzerland, where the resource endowment is so much more limited. The likelihood is that resources would have had a much higher value relative to the other factors of production, like labor and capital. In effect, the Soviet Union's vast size and the implicit assumption that there would always be

more resources available if they were needed all but guaranteed enormous waste. In some ways, the Soviet Union might have been better off had it been less well endowed.

It will not be easy for Soviet leaders to correct for these tendencies, but certainly there is room for improvement. Toward that end, the wholesale prices of all raw materials were finally increased in January, 1982. Based on initial indications, the price of energy raw materials was increased a little more than the price of other raw materials. Similarly, the retail price of gasoline was doubled in September, 1981. In addition, an effort has been under way since July 1, 1979, to do away with the *val* or gross ruble output system. None of this will produce radical changes in the use of energy, but there are already signs of more careful use. After all, if more efficient use of energy can be stimulated in a wasteful country like the United States, the Soviet leaders should also be able to do a better job.

Based on all the information available, Soviet leaders have enough energy resources available so that they need not turn to the import market. That is no minor achievement. If the Soviet planners are forced to import as much as the CIA suggests, it could cost them something like \$35 billion-\$40 billion a year. Since their entire export earnings in hard currency (less earnings from gold, diamonds and munitions) amounted to about \$20 billion a year in 1980, that would pose an enormous burden. The trade deficit actually would be even larger. At the present time, next to Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union is the world's second largest petroleum exporter. A Soviet oil shortage and a consequent inability to export any petroleum to the hard currency world would mean that Soviet hard currency earnings would be reduced by \$11 billion, which would of course increase the trade deficit by a like amount.

Soviet leaders derive no psychic pleasure from exporting petroleum. All things being equal, they would rather save their petroleum for their own use. However, because until recently they had very little else to export, they have not had much choice, particularly if they want to maintain their good credit rating and if they must import as much grain as they have had to import for the last several years.

Because they would like to preserve petroleum for the future, Soviet authorities have been eager to develop and export their enormous natural gas reserves. Even though for the time being the Soviet Union produces less natural gas than the United States, it already exports more than anyone else. However, the price of natural gas per British thermal unit (BTU) on the world market is less than the price of petroleum per BTU. Thus exports of natural gas earned only about \$2.6 billion in hard currency for the Soviet Union in 1980. For that reason, the Soviet Union has two immediate goals: to increase the price of natural gas in

BTU's, and to increase its capacity to export more of its natural gas.

The Soviet Union has been exporting its natural gas for many years. It began exporting to Poland shortly after World War II, using the gas fields that formerly belonged to Poland. In 1967, the Soviet Union began to supply Czechoslovakia, and the following year it also began to supply West Europe, when it extended a new pipeline to Austria. In October, 1973, another gas pipeline was opened, to West Germany, and gradually the Soviet Union's West European customers for gas came to include France, Italy and Finland. At the present time, Soviet exports to West Europe amount to approximately 20 billion cubic meters.

In an effort to increase its exports of natural gas and thereby to increase its hard currency export earnings, the Soviet Union has been engaged for some time in trying to convince the West Europeans to underwrite the cost of a new 3,000-mile natural gas pipeline to West Europe. The Soviet Union has been trying to increase hard currency exports of natural gas to about 66 billion cubic meters. In addition to those already mentioned, the customers for the increased exports might include Switzerland, Belgium and Sweden. The Netherlands was also involved for a time but apparently changed its mind in early 1982. The pipeline may cost as much as \$15 billion but may produce hard currency earnings of as much as \$8 billion a year for the Soviet Union. This would go a long (if not the entire) way to offsetting the income heretofore generated by petroleum exports.

THE GAS PIPELINE

While many Europeans are enthusiastic about the pipeline, United States government officials, especially those in the White House and the Pentagon, are concerned and have tried to obstruct, if not prevent, its construction. To the Europeans, the advantages offset the disadvantages. They realize that the pipeline will increase their dependence on the Soviet Union and that they may be vulnerable to political blackmail. In reply, the Europeans argue, they need the jobs that pipe manufacture and pipeline construction will bring. In addition, they seek as many diverse sources of energy supply as possible. As they see it, the Soviet Union is no less reliable than the Arab nations they would otherwise turn to. Norway, Great Britain and the Netherlands have some natural gas, but they are reluctant to develop their resources at the present time, choosing to reserve their deposits for the future. In addition, the West Europeans insist that Soviet natural gas will never amount to more than 30 percent of total gas consumption, which in turn means that Soviet gas will amount to only about 6 percent of the total energy supplies consumed in West Europe. Moreover, the West Europeans say they are constructing large gas storage facilities as well as alternate fuel standby and

gas switching capability so that there will be adequate standby capacity for several months if the Soviet Union ever decides to cut off the flow. Of course, the knowledge that the West Europeans have that standby capability will tend to dissuade Soviet leaders from cutting off the supply in the first place. Finally, the West Europeans point out that so far the Soviet record for fulfilling contractual commitments for the delivery of natural gas in West Europe has been excellent. The Austrians have had no political disruption in the flow of their natural gas since deliveries first began 14 years ago, in 1968. In times of exceptionally cold weather, when consumption all along the pipeline increases, there is sometimes difficulty in supplying those at the end of the pipeline. There were several similar problems in Ohio in 1977 and 1978 in this country. When cold weather occurs, disruptions are likely to take place.

However, because the Soviet Union is so badly in need of hard currency, it is under strong pressure to continue the flow of energy resources. For example, Soviet leaders cheated in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War energy embargo. Even though the Soviet Union did all it could to urge the Arab members of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) to impose the embargo, it began the flow of natural gas and maintained it through the new pipeline to West Germany, which was opened a mere two weeks before the imposition of the embargo. Similarly, Soviet leaders covertly increased oil deliveries to the United States and the Netherlands, the two countries most affected by the oil embargo. In each instance, Soviet leaders were more concerned with profits than with politics.

United States officials who oppose the pipeline argue that this is only a Faustian bargain; the West Europeans are selling their souls for a short-term increase in energy supplies. Setting aside so much money for a pipeline in the Soviet Union, they argue, will make it all the more difficult to generate funds for alternative energy products. This money would be better spent on increasing exploration in the North Sea and in importing coal from the United States. The West Europeans respond that both projects entail risks and political vulnerability.

Finally, the Americans point out that while the Soviet Union may have cheated during the Yom Kippur oil embargo, there have been several other instances where the Soviet Union itself was involved in a dispute

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"It is incorrect to infer from actions like the Afghan invasion that Soviet appetites are so insatiable that Moscow is willing to risk a major confrontation to expand its influence in the third world," notes this specialist, who concludes that "as the Soviet stake in the international order has increased, its unwillingness to offer a risk-laden challenge to the status quo is reflected in a marked loss of revolutionary fervor."

The Soviet Union in the Third World

BY ROBERT H. DONALDSON

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JOURNALISTIC coverage and political discussion of the third world trouble spots of the early 1980's—the Middle East from Lebanon to Iran; Central America, southwest Asia; eastern and southern Africa—have included urgent focus on the intentions and activities of the Soviet Union. Given the ideological foundations of Soviet foreign policy and Moscow's long tradition of "fishing in troubled waters," it is not surprising that many pundits and politicians see "the hands of the Soviets" underlying much of the trouble.

And yet, the currently fashionable notion that the primary Soviet purpose in the third world is to foment conflict and exploit all signs of instability overlooks an important dimension of Soviet policy. A global superpower, the Soviet Union pursues its national interests in every corner of the world. As it seeks to establish its influence and promote its economic, diplomatic and strategic interests, Moscow has on many occasions encountered obstacles that have caused it to abandon Marxist-Leninist principles in favor of more traditional objectives. Indeed, to the extent that Moscow has concentrated on establishing its presence and building its influence in non-Communist third world countries, it has tended to relegate the promotion of revolutionary change to a more distant future. Whether Soviet policy is directed toward the promotion of conflict or stability varies considerably, depending less on ideological considerations than on Moscow's current estimate of its capabilities and of the strategic importance of a given geographical area.

From the very beginning of the Bolshevik movement in Russia, its leaders have avowed an appreciation of the importance of the "East" to the world revolutionary cause. In the years immediately following the October Revolution, Lenin and his colleagues concentrated their attention in foreign policy on problems relating to the industrially advanced countries of Europe. Yet they remained sensitive to the role that the "toiling masses of the east" could play in assisting the Russian proletariat to achieve its victory over the world imperialist system. Still, it remained for Joseph Stalin's successors to make (probably their most important for-

eign policy achievement) the first substantial and continuing Soviet investments in the area now commonly known as the third world.

The initial thrust of the Soviet entry into the countries of the east came in seeming response to the policies both of Moscow's American rival and the new Soviet ally in Beijing. Washington's efforts in 1954-1955 to enlarge the ring of containment by enlisting allies on the Soviet Union's southern periphery (Pakistan, Iran, Iraq) alarmed Soviet leaders. The hostile reaction to the American policy on the part of the emerging "neutralist" nations encouraged Moscow to counterattack. Moreover, China's Prime Minister Zhou En-lai demonstrated anew the possibilities for a Communist-nationalist alliance against the imperialist designs when he capitalized on the anti-imperialist mood at the 1955 Bandung Conference of Asian and African states in Indonesia.

Thus by the mid-1950's Soviet leaders were reawakening the Leninist perception of the third world as the vital "strategic reserve" of imperialism—an arena in which the Soviet Union could wage the bipolar struggle with solid prospects of success, but at a lower level of risk than would be posed by a direct challenge in the "main arena" of confrontation. The year's significant events foreshadowed Soviet priorities and techniques in this new arena: Moscow's entry into the Middle East by means of the arms deal with President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt; the visit of India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to Moscow and the return trip by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Marshal N. Bulganin to India, Burma and Afghanistan; the dramatic announcement that the Soviet Union would finance and construct a giant steel mill at Bhilai in India.

These targets of Soviet activity were chosen for their strategic importance in the struggle with the West rather than for any particular features of their internal development. The early attention given by Moscow to the Middle East and South Asia reflected the relative weight these lands carried in Soviet security calculations. Having thus identified their priorities, Soviet

leaders soon set about—with great optimism but with little sophisticated knowledge of the domestic affairs of the third world states—to revise the ideological bases of their new policy.

Like Lenin, Khrushchev sensed that as long as the brunt of the independence movement was aimed against the “imperialist” West it would serve the security interests of the Communist East. There was a sufficient community of interest to provide the basis for a temporary alliance against the common enemy—a new “Zone of Peace.” And yet it was Khrushchev’s confident expectation that aid from the socialist bloc would allow the third world countries to break away from the imperialist economic grip and launch their plans for industrialized and truly national economies on the model of the Soviet Union’s development. A class-conscious proletariat would inevitably emerge in these countries, ready to respond to the political program of its Communist vanguard and—once the “national bourgeoisie” had revealed the compromising side of its dual nature—to assume political power, even by peaceful means.

But (to paraphrase a remark that Soviet writers would later aim at third world leaders) it is easier to proclaim the prospects for socialism than to achieve it. Only a few years after their initial plunge into Asia and Africa, Soviet leaders were discovering that their initial ideological optimism concerning the enlargement of the camp of socialism was misplaced. With only a few exceptions (like Indonesia), the Communist parties in these regions were either nonexistent, weak, or persecuted by the Soviet Union’s new nationalist allies. Some Afro-Asian Communist leaders were bold enough to voice their frustration at this state of affairs. But the primary problem was the unwillingness of the nationalist and revolutionary elites in the third world nations to adhere to Marxism-Leninism or to “scientific socialism” or to proclaim their willingness to establish “people’s democracies.” The fiercely nationalist leaders of Asia and Africa had their own goals for political and economic progress; although many of them were influenced by Marxist thought and “socialist” ideals, they were loath to accept the Soviet approach and model. And needless to say, those leaders who spurned formal Communist affiliation were uncomfortable with a Soviet policy that proclaimed their inevitable removal from power. In this early stage, then, the lure of Communist ideology failed to lead to Soviet success.

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union’s approach to the third world was developing in truly opportunistic fashion, exemplified by Moscow’s willingness to modify the Marxist-Leninist doctrine to fit a variety of circumstances and by its use of a wide range of instruments

for establishing its presence and extending its influence. Moscow’s relations with the nations of the third world soon extended far beyond ideological appeals and spread into the political, economic, cultural and military spheres. Soviet leaders reached beyond government-to-government dealings and embraced relationships with both Communist and non-Communist parties; contacts and exchanges among trade union, student, scientific, artistic and other groups (both directly through Soviet counterpart organizations and through various international Communist-front organizations); the massive dissemination of printed material and radio propaganda; the on-the-scene activities of tens of thousands of civilian and military Soviet technicians and advisers. Taken as a whole, Soviet contacts with third world countries exemplify the techniques of what Andrew Scott has termed “informal penetration”—“means by which the agents or instruments of one country gain access to the population [or parts of it] or processes of another country” and in which “the special nature of cold warfare must be sought.”¹

SOPHISTICATED FOREIGN AID

Just as the Soviet leaders learned not to rely on ideology to forge ties in the third world, so they have become more sophisticated about economic aid. In recent years, the spectacular aid projects Khrushchev favored have been abandoned, and Soviet aid and trade agreements are now cast in a longer-range framework, institutionalized through bilateral economic commissions and allowing for greater integration with Soviet and East European plans for development. In a growing number of cases, imports from the less developed countries have been utilized as alternatives to domestic investment in the exploitation of raw materials. Increasingly, the motivations for Soviet aid and trade have been expressed in terms of mutual economic benefit, including the joint exploration and production of raw materials, with repayment provided through shipments of the product itself.

Soviet aid and trade relations remain concentrated in a few areas, but there is little doubt that these are chosen according to considerations of strategic benefit rather than by criteria of “progressiveness” alone. Even in cases where radical pro-Soviet regimes have been replaced by more moderate and less friendly governments, Soviet leaders have demonstrated a concern for protecting their considerable investments by maintaining “businesslike relations.” In addition to economic factors like debt repayment, the acquisition of new markets and access to raw materials, Soviet leaders consider strategic factors like the degree of Chinese or Western interest in a specific country, its importance to Soviet security, or its ability to provide support facilities—including airports, harbors and sites for communication stations—for Soviet military activities.

This emphasis on the military has assumed greater

¹Andrew M. Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration* (New York: Random House, 1965), especially chapter 1.

importance in recent years as the Soviet Union has deployed a substantial naval force in the oceans and seas surrounding the third world and as it has sought to use this force not merely for military defense but for the purpose of "protecting state interests in time of peace." In the Mediterranean Sea and in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union has sought to establish a peacetime naval presence, featuring frequent calls at the ports of the littoral countries, both to demonstrate Soviet interest in these areas and to signal Soviet resolve in time of crisis.

In over a quarter of a century of active involvement, the Soviet Union has acquired a considerable stake in areas of the third world. However, we should not make the mistake of assuming that this large investment implies that the third world is an objective of highest Soviet priority. For the Soviet Union also has vital interests elsewhere in the world. The compatibility of one vital interest—the relationship with the United States—with the active promotion of "national-liberation struggle" in the third world has been challenged by the United States ever since the closing months of President Gerald Ford's administration. Soviet leaders, however, have denied that a conflict exists between their obligations under "détente" and their commitment to the "liberation struggle." Indeed, support of third world "liberation" movements remains for Soviet leaders a primary means of demonstrating—at a time when they are under heavy challenge—their continuing ideological bona fides and their loyalty to a revolutionary obligation.

Nevertheless, President Leonid Brezhnev's approach seems more attuned to the satisfaction of Soviet military and economic interests, just as it has lowered the expectation that third world regimes are viable candidates for a rapid transformation to socialism. Under Brezhnev, the Soviet timetable is longer and the style more cautious than it was in Khrushchev's time; there are now immediate goals, like access to key resources or support facilities for naval expeditions. For these objectives and the supporting range of tactics, Richard Lowenthal's term "counterimperialism" seems appropriate.² And this complex of interests, more than the revolutionary impulse or ideological affinity, seems to provide Moscow's major criteria for the concentration of its energies and resources in the third world.

LATIN AMERICA

Since Moscow's priorities in the third world are conditioned more by geostrategic interests than by ideology, Latin America is the region of lowest priority, even when its revolutionary potential seems high. Although much attention has focused in recent months

on alleged Soviet designs in this region—Central America and the Caribbean in particular—the Soviet Union has neither economic nor military interests in Latin America that are vital to its well-being. In large part, relative Soviet disinterest has stemmed from Moscow's recognition of the chief geopolitical reality in the Western Hemisphere—the primacy of United States interests and power there.

Soviet objectives in Latin America are oriented less toward winning new adherents to the socialist bloc than toward denying strategic resources and markets to the United States. Moscow's single important stake in the region is Cuba—a model for the region and for the entire third world by virtue of its being an indigenous nationalist revolutionary regime successfully embarked on the path of socialist transformation. But the irony of the Cuban success is that it has stimulated a stiffened United States resistance which, together with the enormous economic burden it has posed for the U.S.S.R., makes its repetition highly unlikely.

Moscow's unwillingness to bankroll President Salvador Allende Gossens's socialist revolution in Chile or to risk severe damage to United States-Soviet relations by military assistance to that regime made its eventual overthrow likely. A strikingly similar situation seemed to be developing in Nicaragua in mid-1982, where the Sandinist regime's ideological fervor and economic ineptitude aroused growing popular resistance but noticeably failed to evoke concrete economic assistance from the Soviet Union. Likewise in El Salvador, Moscow seemed content to keep the pot stirred with low-key and indirect assistance to the leftist guerrillas, relying on the regime's shortsighted repressiveness to provide the main stimulus to the revolutionary cause.

In the year's other cause célèbre in Latin America—the crisis over the Falklands/Malvinas—Soviet leaders were active in their rhetorical support of Argentine nationalism and "anti-imperialism" but were slow to provide concrete military or diplomatic backing for the Argentine junta's war effort. In general, then, Moscow's approach to Latin America has been cautious—exploiting limited opportunities for exacerbating United States difficulties but (except for Cuba) avoiding heavy investment or high-risk involvement.

AFRICA

Closer to home but still separated from the Soviet Union's vital border regions, Africa has on occasion been a target of intense Soviet attention. Two decades ago, Nikita Khrushchev's regime harbored fond hopes that a combination of ideological appeal and emulation of the Soviet development model would attract new nations in Africa to the Marxist-Leninist camp. The shocking deterioration of Soviet positions of influence in countries like Ghana, Mali and Guinea impressed Khrushchev's heirs with the fragility of African regimes and the limitations of Soviet capabilities in that continent.

²Richard Lowenthal, "Soviet Counterimperialism," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 25, no. 6 (November-December, 1976), pp. 52-63.

By the mid-1970's, the Soviet Union had developed a naval and airlift capability sufficient to support a more direct military involvement in Africa. This more active phase of Soviet intervention featured the deployment of Cuban ground forces, supported by Soviet personnel, alongside leftist "national-liberation forces" in southern (Angola, Namibia) and eastern (Ethiopia) Africa. But Soviet objectives remain relatively modest, especially in comparison with Khrushchev's goals. Moscow hopes by its presence to gain a voice in African affairs and, in particular, to obtain leverage over the liberation movements in southern Africa. By enhancing its own influence in the "front-line" states, the U.S.S.R. hopes to reduce Western and Chinese influence. More concretely, Moscow intends not only to deny to the United States certain strategic assets and mineral resources in Africa, but to obtain access to such resources and facilities for itself.

Although Moscow has a substantial foothold, especially in Angola and Ethiopia, and has gained access to key naval and air facilities that support the global operational capability of Soviet military forces, there is no indication that any of these gains are permanent. Both Ethiopia and Angola are tied to Moscow by more than state-to-state links, because in both cases the regimes profess a Marxist-Leninist orientation that presumably assures a more durable alliance. But the limits to Soviet influence are well illustrated by the total collapse a few years ago of its alliance with Somalia, despite solemn treaty ties, a huge Soviet investment, and significant Somali dependence on the military supply relationship with Moscow. If Soviet leaders were unable to deflect the Somalis from their conflict with Ethiopia in the Ogaden—a failure that produced a complete reversal of alliances in the region—then there is little reason to expect that Moscow's current allies will prove any more subservient when their national interests diverge from Soviet objectives.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Closer to the Soviet periphery and thereby far more important in Moscow's foreign policy is the Middle East. Since the mid-1950's, the U.S.S.R. has been active in the region both diplomatically and militarily, as it has sought to increase its influence at the expense of that of the West and, toward that end, to promote Arab unity in an anti-imperialist and anti-Israeli bloc. While the Soviet Union has scored some successes, its quest for long-term positions of influence has been frustrated precisely by the fractiousness of the Arabs and the deep-seated Islamic suspicion of Soviet-style communism. The Arab landscape is littered with the debris of shattered relationships with Moscow. Sudan, Egypt and now Iraq are the most prominent examples—in the latter two cases, despite treaty relationships and substantial military ties. While Sudan and Egypt defected to the Americans, both Iraq and Iran

offer clear examples of regional powers over whom neither the Americans nor the Russians have acquired much influence.

Apart from its clearly volatile ties with Libya, Moscow's strongest current relationships are with Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Even these ties, however, were dramatically strained during the crisis in Lebanon, when Moscow was much criticized for the seeming inferiority of its weapons and its evident unwillingness to stand in the way of Israel's military operations. Both the PLO's Yasir Arafat and Syria's Hafez Assad emerged from the Israeli attack greatly weakened, although in this condition they may ultimately prove to be even more susceptible to Soviet influence. From Moscow's standpoint, taking the major risk of direct military involvement seemed pointless in the face of the Arabs' own disunity and apparent unwillingness to confront Israel's military power.

ASIAN INFLUENCE

As an Asian power itself, Moscow has long been deeply involved in that continent. But in this area as well, Soviet leaders have encountered difficulties in establishing lasting influence. Soviet power in Asia encounters several other strong Asian states—most notably, China, Japan, India and Vietnam. Seeing China as their major rival in the region and viewing Japan largely as a surrogate for the United States, Soviet leaders have tried to build stable relationships with India and Vietnam as partners in their effort to contain Chinese and American power and to strengthen their own security at the expense of their rivals' positions.

Despite the considerable investments they have made in the region and the relative ease with which they can bring their capabilities to bear, Soviet leaders have not made impressive gains in Asia. Their relationship with India is close, but it is founded on a pragmatic congruence of interests, and the Soviets have been strikingly unsuccessful in persuading the Indians to take positions that they do not regard as in their own interests. Like India, Vietnam is anxious to avoid long-term dependence on the U.S.S.R. Even though it currently needs considerable Soviet economic and military help, Hanoi views the Russians with deep suspicion and is determined to pursue its own national aims without interference from Moscow. Soviet relations with other countries in the region—particularly those that belong to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—are neither close nor substantial.

Some analysts in the early 1980's argued that the Soviet Union's historical record in the third world is an unreliable guide to its future conduct. In the Indian Ocean region, in particular, they warned of a possible shift of Soviet policy in a more expansionist direction. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979, was viewed as a turning point, a forerunner of

events to come, even—in the view of the United States Army Chief of Staff—the beginning shot in World War III. But those who assume this stance overlook the special circumstances in Afghanistan that undoubtedly led the Soviet Union to choose the policy instrument that it did. Afghanistan was a client state, challenged by a military uprising, on the periphery of the U.S.S.R., vital to Soviet security interests and seemingly not at all related to American interests. Because it was a Marxist-Leninist regime linked to the Soviet Union by a solemn security treaty, its overthrow would represent a challenge not only to Soviet security interests but also to Soviet credibility. Thus the Soviet Union used military force in Afghanistan to maintain an existing regional balance, not to upset it.

To put in perspective the Soviet relationship with the third world, it is worth recalling how far Moscow has progressed in its presence and influence compared with its almost total isolation only 30 years ago. The trends cited here are not intended to deny the fact that the U.S.S.R. has substantial weight in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, but rather to suggest that Moscow's policies may have reached a point of diminishing returns.

The powerful force of nationalism has been a major obstacle to Moscow's effort to enlist the resources and support of the countries of the third world. Moreover, the third world's growing determination to exert full political and economic sovereignty has underscored the incompatibility between its own purposes and preferences and those of the industrialized "great powers." Like the United States, Moscow has been slow to learn that the third world is not simply an arena for superpower competition, a passive stake in the superpower struggle.

At a time when the third world is concentrating on achieving a New International Economic Order, Moscow is less and less interested in economic assistance. Weapons constitute over half the Soviet Union's exports to the third world, and the arms trade is an important source of hard currency for the Soviet Union. To be sure, the Soviet Union's claims for its economic assistance program have been considerably scaled down since the mid-1960's; Moscow now stresses the limitations on its ability to provide credits but still professes to be helping to the greatest extent possible. The reality is that the average annual Soviet aid contribution amounts to about .05 percent of its gross national product (GNP), compared to about .33 percent for the Western countries. For most third world countries, Soviet economic assistance is virtually nonexistent, since Moscow's aid program has been highly concentrated. Nor is Soviet aid extended to the less developed countries for the free purchase of needed commodities; it is strictly "tied" to Soviet goods, usually in the context of approved projects.

What is happening to the Soviet Union in the third

world is a stark illustration of the handicaps that Moscow suffers as a result of its limited international economic capabilities. Soviet leaders have been able to gain footholds in a number of strategic third world locations, particularly on the periphery of the Indian Ocean, by virtue of their political and military support of leftist movements, backed up with ample supplies of Soviet arms and frequently with Cuban troops. And yet they have found it exceedingly difficult to sustain their influence or to prop up their client regimes through military means alone. Conversely, in areas where the U.S.S.R. has not established a military supply relationship, it has hardly any influence. To put it another way, the expanding political ambitions of Soviet leaders in the third world, initially boosted by their military instrumentalities, may in the longer run be undermined by Moscow's limited economic capabilities.

Apart from the implications that this limitation has for the long-term success or failure of Soviet policies in the third world, the Soviet overreliance on the military has profound consequences for both East-West and North-South relations. In the former case, the wave of Soviet interventionism in Africa and the Middle East, even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, aroused American anxieties to the point of reversing progress in arms limitations talks and the overall "détente" relationship. The costs of this setback to East-West relationships and the revival of United States-Soviet zero-sum competition in the third world are compounded by the danger that domestic stability and the prospects for progress toward development in the third world will be even further disrupted.

Soviet influence in the third world at the beginning of the 1980's remains limited, in part by the strong impulses toward autonomy and national self-determination of the third world countries themselves. Many of Moscow's biggest "victories" have resulted from events over which it had little or no control. It is equally important to realize that Soviet objectives in this part of the world are not unlimited. It is incorrect to infer from actions like the Afghan invasion that Soviet appetites are so insatiable that Moscow is willing to risk a major confrontation to expand its influence in the third world.

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"The use of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union might be effective in persuading Soviet leaders to negotiate an arms reduction treaty, to exert less pressure on Poland, and to ease emigration policies." Nonetheless, warns this author, "Western unity is a prerequisite for effective economic sanctions."

Soviet Industry and Trade

BY ALICE C. GORLIN

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As the Soviet Union enters the 1980's, its prospects for favorable industrial performance are extremely gloomy. Many observers believe that fundamental decentralizing reform of the economy is a prerequisite for the significant improvement of industrial performance, but Soviet leaders are unwilling to make these changes in the management of their economy. In the 1960's and 1970's, the Soviet Union was able to postpone economic reform and still "buy" industrial progress and a better life for the Soviet consumer through an expansion of trade with the industrialized West. Soviet leaders were aided by favorable developments in international markets, including rising prices for petroleum and gold.

Today, however, world market trends are becoming increasingly unfavorable to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also faces a deteriorating relationship with the United States and a perceived need to divert more and more resources into the defense sector. Thus the post-Brezhnev generation of leaders will either have to make radical changes in economic management or face further deterioration in economic performance, assuming no large decrease in the Soviet defense budget.

The decline in Soviet industrial growth rates began in the 1950's, but it became especially pronounced beginning in the late 1970's (see Table 1). The industries with the greatest problems today include steel (where output actually declined in 1979 and 1980), automobiles, cement and paper, and industries on the technological frontier, like consumer electronics.¹ The industrial slowdown may be explained first of all by a fall in the rate of growth of increments of capital, labor, and raw materials. (Table 1 illustrates these trends for capital and labor.) It has become increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to pursue an extensive

growth strategy in which the primary sources of growth are increments to the capital stock and the labor force.

In Western countries, intensive growth replaced extensive growth as improvements in factor productivity (the productivity of land, labor and capital) came to account for about two-thirds of the economic growth. In the Soviet Union, however, only about one-third of the growth is accounted for by improvements in efficiency.² Furthermore, total factor productivity has been declining in recent years and has in fact been negative since 1976. Labor productivity growth has been positive but modest in most years and shows a declining trend since the early 1960's. In the last two years, labor productivity in industry has only grown 1.4 percent per year.

An additional factor in the decline in industrial growth is the imbalance in the rates of growth of capital and labor during the postwar period. Capital has grown much faster than labor, and apparently Soviet industry has experienced difficulty in substituting capital for labor.

The eleventh five year plan (1981-1985) is attempting to redress recent trends in industrial growth, projecting average annual growth rates of 4.7-5.1 percent during the five year period. Nevertheless, these projected growth rates are the lowest of any Soviet five year plan to date. The plan is based on ambitious growth rates in labor productivity of about 4.5 percent per year and on relatively low growth rates in investment (2.3 to 2.8 percent per year). The pattern of investment will concentrate on the modernization of existing factories and the completion of unfinished investment projects rather than the construction of new factories. Soviet leaders are presumably aware of the problems of substituting additional capital for labor and are also trying to tailor their investment strategy to their labor shortage. In short, why build new factories if you cannot find the labor to man them? Finally, the plan emphasizes the introduction of new technology as a way of improving productivity.

Prospects for the fulfillment of industry's goals in the current five year plan are not promising. In 1981, industrial output only grew 3.4 percent versus a

¹Daniel L. Bond and Herbert S. Levine, "The 11th Five-Year Plan, 1981-85," in *Russia at the Crossroads*, edited by Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 88; Marshall I. Goldman, "Let's Exploit Moscow's Weakness," *The New York Times*, April 4, 1982.

²Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, *Soviet Economic Structure and Performance*, 2d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 398.

Table 1: Average Annual Rates of Growth (in Percentages) of Soviet Industrial Production, Capital and Labor Inputs, and Factor Productivity

	1961-65 ^a	1966-70 ^a	1971-75 ^a	1976-80 ^a	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Industrial production	6.6	6.3	5.9	3.6	6.2	3.9	4.0	3.5	3.0	3.4
Factor productivity	-0.1	0.5	1.1	-0.6	1.3	-1.0	-0.4	-0.7	-1.1	-0.2
Manhours	3.6	3.1	4.4	2.0	4.4	1.6	2.4	1.8	1.6	2.4
Capital	-4.0	-2.3	-2.4	-3.5	-2.1	-3.9	-3.3	-3.4	-4.0	-2.9
Combined inputs ^b	6.7	5.7	4.8	4.2	4.8	5.0	4.3	4.3	4.1	3.5
Manhours	2.9	3.1	1.5	1.5	1.7	2.2	1.5	1.7	1.3	1.0
Capital	11.0	8.7	8.6	7.3	8.4	8.1	7.5	7.2	7.3	6.4

^aFor computing the average annual rates of growth, the base year is the year prior to the stated period.

^bInputs of manhours and capital are combined using weights of 52.4 percent and 47.6 percent, respectively, in a Cobb-Douglas (linear homogeneous) production function. These weights represent the distribution of labor costs (wages and social insurance deductions) and capital costs (depreciation and a 20-percent charge on gross fixed capital) in 1970, the base year for all indexes underlying the growth rate calculations.

Source: National Foreign Assessment Center, U. S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics 1981*, table 44.

planned rate of growth of 4.1 percent.³ Industrial output in the first three months of 1982 grew by only 2.1 percent over the same period in 1981, below the growth rate needed to reach the 1982 target of 4.7 percent. Performance in the energy sector was generally favorable, but steel production was lower than in the first quarter of 1981.

Many Western economists believe that the trends of 1981 and early 1982 will continue throughout the five year plan and beyond, because of several factors. First, increments to the labor force will continue to decline. Soviet planners have already brought many pensioners into the labor force and have increased the participation rates of all groups, women in particular. Further increases in the size of the industrial labor force through these tactics will be marginal at best.⁴ Forcing the population to substitute work for leisure would be politically dangerous. And recent demographic trends militate against any large natural increase in the labor force.

Second, the rate of growth of investment will continue to decline, in part because of the increasing claim made by the defense sector on resources. A sharp increase in investment might increase the rate of growth in industry, but it would have to come at the expense of the military sector and/or consumption, which would have negative effects on incentives and labor productivity.

And third, although there is considerable disagree-

ment on this question, many experts believe that energy supplies will act as a constraint on future growth. Even if sufficient energy is available for domestic production, if fuel exports for hard currency decrease, the Soviet Union will not be able to import as much machinery; this will result in low growth.

Military spending is obviously an area in which cutbacks could free substantial resources to improve economic performance in the civilian economy. However, according to United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates, the Soviet military budget has been increasing since the mid-1960's by 4 to 5 percent per year. Furthermore, fairly large cutbacks in military spending would probably be necessary to achieve noticeable improvement in the civilian economy.⁵ Some analysts have concluded that because military spending places such a heavy burden on the Soviet civilian economy, the situation offers the United States an opportunity to negotiate significant arms reductions with the Soviet Union. Many of President Ronald Reagan's advisers believe that the Soviet economy's deteriorating performance has reached crisis proportions and that influential individuals in the Soviet Union's leadership are proposing cutbacks in military spending as a way out.⁶

ECONOMIC REFORM

Prospects for extensive Soviet growth in the 1980's and beyond are not promising. However, Soviet leaders have other options. They can reform the organization and management of the domestic economy, and they can seek an expansion of foreign trade ties, in particular through increased purchases of advanced technology from the industrialized West. Both approaches are designed to improve the productivity of labor and capital.

It is now widely recognized both inside and outside the Soviet Union that the economic reform of the 1960's was a failure. The reform was supposed to improve productivity by reducing the detail of plans and the extent of bureaucratic interference in the activities

³"The Supreme Soviet Session IV," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 33, no. 49 (January 6, 1982), p. 15; "The Report on 1981 Plan Fulfillment," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 34, no. 4 (February 24, 1982), p. 16.

⁴Murray Feshbach, "Population and Labor Force," in *The Soviet Economy to the Year 2000*, edited by Abram Bergson and Herbert S. Levine (London: Allen & Unwin, forthcoming).

⁵Abraham S. Becker, "Guns, Butter, and the Brezhnev Succession," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 21, 1982.

⁶"U.S. Sees Economic, Military Incentives Prompting Soviets to Accept Arms Treaty," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 29, 1982.

of factory managers, and by putting greater reliance on market forces. Such changes would have enabled enterprise managers to lay off surplus workers and reorganize factory production in order to increase labor productivity. In addition, with less detailed planning and better market-based information, managers were to introduce innovations into their factories, thereby increasing labor and capital productivity.

The official reform statutes did not decentralize decision-making sufficiently to achieve the desired results. In addition, the reform provisions were never really enforced. Industrial ministries have continued to interfere in enterprise decision-making, in violation of the spirit and letter of the reform. And a series of amendments introduced in the 1970's actually legitimized bureaucratic interference by restoring ministerial rights over enterprises.⁷

The most recent reform is the planning decree of 1979. Its two most important aspects are an emphasis on longer-term planning and the introduction of a new success indicator—normative net value of output (value added as opposed to gross output). Enterprises are now supposed to operate on the basis of five year rather than annual plans. The emphasis on making plans more stable over the five year plan period is an attempt to deal with the short-run orientation of factory managers, which has been a major factor impeding the introduction of new technology. It is also designed to reduce the incentives to hoard labor. The new success indicator is intended to discourage enterprises from violating their assortment plans by producing a disproportionate share of material-intensive, expensive products. However, it is feared that the new indicator may involve high administrative costs and may cause enterprises to produce excessive amounts of labor-intensive goods, an irrational choice from a national point of view in a period of labor shortages.⁸

Recent attempts to improve the organization and management of the economy are in sharp contrast to

the 1965 reform, which at least tried to introduce a measure of decentralization into the economy. In the 1980's, the stress is on improving planning with the aid of computers and mathematical methods, emphasizing longer-term planning, strengthening plan discipline, and increasing tutelage over enterprises, with additional planning indicators governing everything from quality to contract compliance. The degree of centralization has increased, and the industrial ministries have been a major beneficiary. Therefore, it is worthwhile to speculate on whether organizational changes involving the creation of new kinds of ministries might help Soviet industry solve some of its problems.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

Developments in planning and management of Soviet industry over the next 20 years depend critically on the evolution of ministerial power. The ministries were all-powerful in the Stalin era, an arrangement that had economic merit because the goals of the economy were few and relatively simple. Powerful ministries mirrored, reinforced and brought to fruition the economic priorities set by Premier Joseph Stalin. For example, one of Stalin's goals was rapid expansion of the steel industry. Stalin did not have time to monitor developments in the steel industry personally; thus the creation of a powerful Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy helped Stalin ensure that his priorities were actually carried out. It must also have been clear to the ministries that their mandate for rapid development of key industrial branches meant that certain kinds of behavior (excessive vertical integration, lack of cooperation with other ministries, concentration on a narrow and/or inappropriate product mix, and lack of attention to quality) would be tolerated. These negative behaviors imposed costs on the economy that were undoubtedly significant. Once industrial capacity was created, the benefits of powerful ministries organized along product lines were pretty much exhausted, and the costs became much more significant.

The ministries have survived the challenge to their power represented by the 1965 reform and indeed have emerged in a strengthened position. What, then, of the future? Investment funds will be far scarcer over the next 20 years. Any 1930's power struggle over resources pales in comparison to what we can expect in the 1980's and 1990's. If the Soviet leadership continues to rely on a ministerial structure to achieve its goals, then a reorganization of ministerial boundaries is probably called for, because the problems faced by the economy are different and far more subtle than the problems of the 1930's. Thus it is no longer a question of creating the capacity to produce steel. Rather, the question is how the steel industry can best contribute to the production of sufficient energy over the next 20 years.

⁷Gregory and Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

⁸Joseph S. Berliner, "Planning and Management," in *The Soviet Economy to the Year 2000*. Another analyst, Nancy Nimitz, believes that the 1979 reform may be successful in reducing the excess demand for labor:

... The achievement of plan stability is a critical condition for achieving the fourth reform goal—a reduction in excess demand for labor. Granted this condition, other measures encouraging producers to release redundant labor should ultimately outweigh the initially negative influence of prices encouraging more wage intensive output. Other measures include absolute upper limits on enterprise employment, a directive target for reducing manual labor, a wage fund divorced from the number of employees (and related instead to output), and a bonus fund divorced from the size of the wage fund.

See also Nancy Nimitz, "Reform and Technological Innovation in the 11th Five-Year Plan," in *Russia at the Crossroads*, p. 152.

Ministries must organize around economic problems rather than products. There is evidence that Soviet leaders are thinking along these lines; and there have been suggestions for "supraministries," which would be in charge of groups of related activities. Examples are fuel and power, transportation, and the production and processing of agricultural products.⁹

The Soviet approach to creating supraministries would probably emphasize vertical integration in order to minimize the number of market-like relationships among producers subordinate to different bureaucracies. It would be impossible, however, to suppress all such relationships in a modern complex economy, and lack of cooperation among the bureaucracies would be a continuing problem. Nevertheless, such an organizational approach might enable the economy to focus its energies on well-defined problems in the heavy industrial sector, like energy production. In other branches of industry, like consumer goods, where products are highly differentiated and the product mix changes rapidly, this approach would not be workable.

The history of the Soviet economy is replete with organizational reforms to solve economic problems, although most of the reshuffling has had a marginal effect on economic performance. But Soviet leaders are always looking for a new "organizational fix." Many Western observers are, not surprisingly, skeptical about the latest suggestions. For example, the participants at a conference on the 26th congress of the CPSU (Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.) concluded:

Current attempts to establish territorial-production complexes and reorganize ministries are believed to be merely a reshuffling of the enormous Soviet bureaucracy, whose operation is regarded as the fundamental systemic problem which must be combated by structural reform.¹⁰

A very different policy avenue involves a partial return to the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920's. The possibilities of this option were explored by Joseph Berliner at a 1980 conference on the future of the Soviet economy.¹¹ The "liberal model" of the future involves the legalization of private activity and the end of planning in certain sectors of the economy:

⁹"Organization and Management in the Soviet Economy: the Ceaseless Search for Panaceas," National Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, December, 1977, p. 6. A similar proposal is found in the Soviet discussions on the 11th five year plan, where it was suggested that interdepartmental administrative units be set up to solve specific problems that involve more than one ministry. See Bond and Levine, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

¹⁰Richard Coffman and Michael Klecheski, "The 26th Party Congress Conference: The Soviet Union in a Time of Uncertainty," in *Russia at the Crossroads*, p. 202.

¹¹Berliner, *op. cit.*

¹²Trade with COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation) members has accounted for more than 50 percent of Soviet trade throughout the postwar era. See Gregory and Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

light consumer goods, specialized consumer and other services, retailing, and other small-scale, highly specialized production. The liberal model might be combined with some version of organizational changes.

Berliner argues persuasively that the "liberal" model offers Soviet policymakers a golden opportunity to introduce changes in the economy that will bring significant improvements in the assortment and quality of consumer goods and services. It might also have widespread political support. For example, enterprise managers might endorse the liberal model because some of the problems they face would be removed; light industry enterprises could concentrate on mass production of consumer goods and leave the specialty and very high quality items to the unplanned sector. All enterprises would benefit if they could purchase special order inputs and services from the unplanned sector.

There might be egalitarian hostility to some aspects of the liberal scheme, particularly the possible increase in the inequality of income distribution. However, the liberal model is more egalitarian, in the sense that unplanned sector stores would be open to all; today special stores are open only to the elite. In the liberal model, money instead of position would have greater significance. This should strengthen work incentives and lessen political cynicism and opportunism—an ironic turn of events in a Marxist state.

The liberal model may well be the right solution at the right time to some chronic problems of Soviet industry. The leadership should not have much trouble finding an ideological justification for it. Recent efforts to encourage private production in agriculture suggest that neither a change in leadership nor further deceleration of growth is necessary before there are signs of change along the lines of the liberal model.

TRADE OPTIONS

Traditionally, foreign trade has not been very important to the Soviet economy; because of its vast raw material resources, the Soviet Union probably has more potential for complete self-sufficiency than any other country in the world. However, since World War II trade has become much more important. In recent years, Soviet leaders have been more preoccupied with foreign economic relations and have been eager to expand them, especially with the industrialized West. There are at least two reasons for this. First, for economic as well as political motives, the Soviet Union has developed very close trading relations with all the East European countries, with the possible exception of Romania.¹² Strong trade relations foster mutual economic interdependence between the Soviet Union and East Europe and help the Soviet Union maintain political domination over these countries. Second, trade with the industrialized West and Japan enables the Soviet Union to import food and advanced technol-

ogy, which the economy has had trouble producing domestically.

The 1980's have witnessed a change in the economic relationship between the East European socialist countries and the Soviet Union. In the pattern of intrabloc trade, the Soviet Union exported raw materials to East Europe in exchange for machinery, consumer goods and food. This trade pattern and the relationships between intrabloc and world market prices provide solid evidence that the terms of trade have been unfavorable to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been willing to buy goods that the East Europeans would have difficulty selling elsewhere because of their relatively poor quality. Furthermore, the East European countries have been able to import fuels (for the purchase of which they lack sufficient hard currency) from the Soviet Union at prices below world market levels. For example, in 1980 Poland bought Soviet oil at a price 52 percent below the import price from the West.¹³ However, since January, 1982, subsidized Soviet petroleum exports to East Europe are being reduced from 80 to 70 million metric tons per year through 1985. Furthermore, because of recent changes in the way prices for intrabloc trade are set, the prices of Soviet energy exports to East Europe are now near world market levels.¹⁴ These changes are expected to create serious economic difficulties in East Europe.

At a time when Poland is challenging Soviet-style socialism and when the potential for political unrest also exists elsewhere in East Europe, why have the Soviets chosen to turn the economic screws on East Europe? The answers lie in the Soviet Union's trade relationship with the industrialized West and Japan, what it hopes to gain from that relationship, and the dilemmas it faces in trying to foster that relationship in the 1980's.

TRADE WITH THE WEST

Soviet trade with the industrialized West nearly doubled between 1960 and 1978. In the 1970's, Soviet imports grew more rapidly than exports, resulting in an increasing hard currency deficit with the West. Soviet leaders have resorted to several strategies to deal with these deficits. First, they have sold gold. It has been estimated that between September, 1981, and March, 1982, the Soviet Union sold about 300 tons of gold to raise \$3.5 billion. However, falling gold prices have made this an expensive way to deal with the deficit. In 1981, the price of gold fell almost 40 percent.

Second, the Soviets have obtained Western credits

to finance their deficits. The Soviet Union's debts to the West and Japan are now about \$18 billion. Although the Soviet Union has always been a credit-worthy customer, Western banks are becoming increasingly reluctant to extend further credit to East Europe or the Soviet Union.

Third, the Soviet Union has tried to increase its energy exports to the West to earn hard currency to pay for imports; at present about half of Soviet hard-currency earnings come from sales of petroleum. This third strategy is a major reason for the cutback of energy deliveries to East Europe. Falling world oil prices have, however, made it increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to raise cash this way. Jan Vanous, senior economist at Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Associates, has estimated that Soviet exports of oil to the West in 1981 earned \$17.2 billion, about \$400 million less than in 1980.

This shortfall was partly offset by sales of gold, other raw materials, and arms. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Soviet Union is now the number one arms exporter in the world. However, even here the situation is not favorable for the Soviet Union; its arms sales to OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) nations are expected to fall because falling oil prices have reduced these nations' ability to buy arms.

It has become increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to finance its imports from the West. A reversal of recent price declines for gold and oil and favorable trends in Soviet oil production during the 1980's would improve matters considerably. However, Soviet leaders are not counting on this. Since 1977, they have been reducing their non-grain trade with the West; from 1976 to 1977 Soviet orders for Western machinery fell from \$6 billion to \$3.8 billion, and through 1980 orders have averaged about \$2.5 billion per year. There was a bulge in 1981 because of purchases in connection with the natural gas pipeline between Siberia and West Europe, but 1982's trade is expected by some analysts to fall back to previous levels. However, Daniel Bond, director of the Wharton Econometrics Centrally Planned Economics Service, believes the Soviet Union will continue to be a heavy importer from the West, mainly for energy development.

The contribution of Western technology to the Soviet economy is a matter of debate. One recent study emphasizes the small share of total Soviet investment accounted for by imports of Western machinery, and the difficulties faced by the Soviet economy in diffus-

(Continued on page 340)

¹³"Soviet Subsidies to Eastern Economies," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 15, 1982.

¹⁴Morris Bornstein, "Soviet-East European Economic Relations," in *East-West Relations and the Future of Eastern Europe*, edited by Morris Bornstein, Zvi Gitelman, and William Zimmerman (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 107.

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"Apparently it is not recognized anywhere in the Soviet debate that the country's food problem is a creature of the system itself," notes this specialist, who points out that "in the food sector, at least, the socialist system itself is on trial."

New Plans and Old Results for Soviet Agriculture

BY FOLKE DOVRING

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SOVIET agriculture entered the 1980's with more than its share of the problems that pervade the Soviet economy. Some of these problems are highlighted in the eleventh plan (1981-1985) that marks the beginning of the sixth decade of systematically planned expansion. Selected indicators for the twelfth plan (1986-1990) are included in a recently published, more general program for food supply development to 1990.¹

The most obvious problem is resource productivity. A slogan in the literature on the eleventh plan holds that "the economic system must be economical" ("ekonomika dolzhna byt' ekonomna")—an implicit admission that this is not always so. The pressures on the economy are well known and will not be repeated in detail here.² The money income of the population has risen, so that the economic demand for food tends to outrun the physical supply. The difference is articulated, to the embarrassment of the regime, as "repressed inflation" by way of illegal markets. The response in massive grain imports is symptomatic of the regime's attitude toward the problem. The United States grain embargo (January, 1980–April, 1981) appeared to be a minor complication, but it may have had more consequence than most analysts admit.

Despite the clamoring for higher productivity, the new plans are rather conventional. There are some attempts to remedy the built-in inefficiencies of socialized agriculture, but the traces they leave in official sources reveal contradictions and policy conflicts with uncertain outcomes.

The most obvious difficulty in the Soviet food economy was caused by three bad harvest years at a stretch. The grain harvests of 1979, 1980 and 1981 all fell short of the targets by about one-fourth. For each of the three years, total agricultural production was reported lower than the previous year; 1981 is 2 percent

below 1980 and about 4 percent below the average of 1976-1980. The 1982 harvest also appears disappointing.

Events of 1981 are illustrated in a press release from the Central Bureau of Statistics in January, 1982,³ comparing the economic achievements of 1981 with the plan targets of that year and with data from previous years. For the economy as a whole, a growth rate of 3 percent is claimed. Agricultural failures are given less detail than industrial successes. Only cotton, sunflower seed and vegetables reported satisfactory production results. Figures given for potatoes and sugar beets reflect severe setbacks. On grain output, there is complete silence.

Drought contributed all three years, and the question arises whether there are new trends in climate. Whatever damage the weather may have caused, it is not the only cause. Planned production failed in other directions too. Fertilizer production did not reach the targets of the tenth plan (1976-1980) and declined in the late 1970's. Since there is a partial substitution between fertilizers and water, larger fertilizer supplies might have mitigated the impact of drought. Better management, more adequate allocation of land between alternative uses, more timely operation, and so forth, also could have made crop production hold its own somewhat better.

THE FOOD PROGRAM UP TO 1990

The basic problem of the eleventh plan, according to President Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the November, 1981, Plenum,⁴ is food supply, particularly livestock feed. The attempts at rectifying the disappointing trend of recent years are relatively modest. For the five years, an increase of 13 percent in total agricultural production is sought.

For the foreseeable future, no net increase in cropland is envisaged. There will be some loss of land to urbanization, and the best that land reclamation can do is to hold the land base constant. Virtually all the incremental output called for by the plan must come from improved area-unit yields of individual crops.

In the center of the plan is the target for grain production, which is variously forecast as 239 million metric tons on average for the five years of the plan period, or as 245 million metric tons for 1985.

¹*Prodovol'stvennaya programma S.S.S.R. na period do 1990 goda*, published as appendix to *Sel'skaya zhizn'*, May 27, 1982, and *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, no. 23, June, 1982.

²Folke Dovring, "Soviet Agriculture in 1980," *Current History*, October, 1980, pp. 88-91, 105-106.

³*Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, no. 5, January, 1982, pp. 5-7, and *Sel'skaya zhizn'*, January 24, 1982, pp. 1-2.

⁴As reported in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* for November 17, 1981.

Table 1: Grain Production in the U.S.S.R., Recent Data and Plan Targets (Data in Million Metric Tons)

Crop	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	1971-75 Average	1976-80 Average	1980 Plan	1980 Actual	1985 Estimate 11th Plan	1990 Program: 11th Plan 12th Plan	
Wheat	88.9	99.7	106.0	98.2	100	—	—
Rye	11.5	10.8	17.3	10.2	15.7	—	—
Barley and oats	58.1	72.1	73.4	58.1	87	—	—
Maize (corn)	10.2	9.6	16.7	9.5	19	17+	20
Millet	2.5	2.2	3.9	2.8	3.6	—	—
Buckwheat	0.95	0.94	1.65	1.0	1.65	—	—
Rice	1.75	2.3	2.85	2.8	3.1	—	—
Pulses	7.3	6.9	12.7	6.4	14	12-14	18-20
Total, all grains	181.6	205	235.1	189	245	238-243	250-255

Sources: *Narodnoe khozyaystvo* U.S.S.R., 1979, 1980 (cols. 1-2); *Planovoe khozyaystvo* 3, 1978, p. 53 (col. 3); *Vestnik statistiki* 10, 1981, p. 71 (col. 4); *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaystva* 12, December 1981, 4 (cols. 2 and 5); and the 1990 Program (see above, footnote 1), for cols. 6 and 7.

Targets for sugar beets and vegetables are on a similar level. The target for cotton is a modest 3 percent over the preceding plan period, while targets for flax and sunflower seed are designed to recover from setbacks suffered during the tenth plan period. Fruits and berries are slated for expansion somewhat faster than agriculture as a whole, and wine grapes even more so. Stockfeed (roughage and green feed) is also earmarked for more expansion than total crop production.

The targets for grain crops include a commodity composition significantly different from past performance. Some details are shown in Table 1. According to official comments, grain production is to be stepped up in all parts of the country, in Belorussia and the Baltic republics as well as in the non-black-soil parts of Russia. Wheat, the leading grain crop, is slated for a standstill, with concentration in the Volga-Ural regions and in the steppe areas of Siberia and Kazakhstan. The incremental grain production is to be obtained above all by expanding maize (corn), peas and rye, with proportionately large increases also in rice, millet and buckwheat. Barley and oats, which like wheat are already produced in large quantity, are also given less potential for expansion. The program to 1990 expects grain output under the twelfth plan to exceed that of the eleventh plan by only 12 million tons, of which 3 million tons will be maize and 6 million tons will be pulses, leaving very little increment of wheat and other small grains.

Maize and pulses (mainly peas) are given larger hectares; for the other grain crops, only higher area-unit yields are foreseen. Raising the yields of rye as shown in the plan would bring them to the level of current production in Poland and Finland. The target for millet resembles the yields now obtained in southern Europe. The target yield for buckwheat is far out of known ranges.

Some of these features in the eleventh plan resemble the plans of the 1950's. At that time, there was still

emphasis on area expansion. Premiums offered, for instance, for planting more buckwheat at that time fit a pattern of extensification that should now be out of the question. Maize was also expanded at that time, with little success. Still in recent years, area-unit yields of maize in the Soviet Union are barely over half the yields in the United States. Expansion of maize must draw heavily on irrigated lands, which must then be withheld from other crops.

The other crop group slated for doubling in five years, dry pulses, is a more practical target. In the U.S.S.R., dry peas often yield more grain per hectare than spring wheat. Heavy reliance on peas in the twelfth plan may reflect attempts at economizing with nitrogen fertilizers.

Soviet leaders have apparently published no data on grain production for 1981. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) first estimated the 1981 Soviet grain crop at 175 million tons, but there are recent indications that it was even lower, by 10-15 million tons. However, there are official figures on sown areas for 1981,⁵ showing sown areas somewhat lower than in previous years. Total grain area was nearly the same as in 1979 and 1980, which means somewhat less than previous years. Detailed changes are not very large, but areas in maize and peas are already substantially larger.

MEAT AND FEED: STATISTICS AND POLITICS

The large expansion expected from Soviet agriculture is aimed at meat. Milk is near the saturation of effective demand, while eggs and other animal products are of relatively much less significance than meat and milk. Selected data on production and plan targets are shown in Table 2.

Feed is the center of the agricultural problem, according to Brezhnev in his statement of November, 1981. How central the problem is becomes evident when the uses of grains in the U.S.S.R. are considered. The total used for food, industrial uses, seed and dockage-waste is relatively stable at close to 100 million tons

⁵*Vestnik statistiki*, no. 10, 1981, p. 70.

Table 2: Production of Meat, Milk and Eggs in the U.S.S.R. (Recent Data and Plan Targets)

	1971-75 Average	1976-80 Average	1980 Actual	1981 Actual	1981-85 Estimate	1990 Program:	
						11th Plan	12th Plan
Meat (slaughter weight), million metric tons	14.0	14.8	15.1	15.2	17.1	17-17.5	20-20.5
Milk, million metric tons	87.4	92.6	90.9	88.5	98.1	97-99	104-106
Eggs, billion	51.4	63.1	67.8	67.9	72.1	72	78-79

Sources: *Narodnoe khozyaystvo S.S.S.R.*, 1979, 1980; *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaystva*, December 1981, p. 7; January 1981 statistical report on the Soviet economy (see above, footnote 3); and 1990 Food Program (see footnote 1 above).

a year. Variation of grain output, from 237 million tons in the record year of 1978, down to 160-165 million in 1981 (USDA), means a variation in grain available for stockfeed of anywhere from 60-65 million to over 130 million tons. Wheat, peas and other food crops are also fed to livestock to a large extent.

Imported grain covers at most one-half the grain fed to livestock, which in turn is less than two-fifths of all feed used. Over three-fifths are green and dry roughages and pasture. These proportions are of recent origin; in the early 1970's, grain was barely one-third of all feed used.⁶

This places the targets in perspective. The eleventh plan target for roughage is a 22 percent increase over the previous period, against 19 percent for grains. If the grain targets are reached and if nearly all the increment is used for feed, the increase in grain available for feed will be 30 percent or more. The rate for roughage relates to harvested roughage in the "social" sector; it excludes pasture and private resources. The whole of roughage and pasture will then grow less than 22 percent. According to these plans the movement toward more grain feed will continue. It is arguable whether this is the best way to boost livestock production in a country with the Soviet Union's geographic conditions. The program for 1990 foresees continued expansion of meat production but modest increments in grains, which may mean that roughage and pasture will then have to carry more of the expansion in meat. For the present at least, the Soviet economy is strongly dependent on grain imports if the supply of meat is not to deteriorate.⁷

The United States embargo on grain sales to the Soviet Union (in excess of the 8 million tons a year guaranteed by treaty) is generally rated a failure be-

cause it was circumvented. Other exporting countries, with Argentina in the lead, increased their sales to the U.S.S.R. The immediate objective of the embargo, to reduce meat supply in the Soviet Union, apparently failed. Reported meat production fell fractionally in 1980 and rose a little in 1981 without yet reaching the level reported for 1979. There must have been some slight decline in per capita supply, but not enough to make the embargo a success.

The conclusion assumes that we can trust Soviet statistics. In any event, the embargo did inflict some economic penalty on the U.S.S.R. because replacement purchases were made at higher prices. This, in turn, led the Soviets to sell more gold, which contributed to lowering the international price of gold. Less gold in the hands of the Soviet government may not directly affect the level of Soviet food consumption, but it has some effect on the country's economic-political clout abroad, including its ability to support its clients, like Vietnam.

All this relates to the embargo as long as it lasted. Whether its continuation might have been felt more deeply is a matter for conjecture. A press release in June, 1982, showed that meat production on state and collective farms in January-May, 1982, was 1 percent below the same period a year earlier.⁸ Milk also fell by 2 percent, with a drop in output per cow of 3 percent.

Soviet agriculture has long been one of the most capital-intensive agricultural systems in the world, a fact overlooked if one notes only the numbers of machines rather than their weight and fuel consumption. The Soviet tractor fleet grows faster in horsepower than in numbers, and Soviet consumption of motor fuel has for some time been about as large as it is in United States agriculture. High rates of scrapping point to larger mileage for each machine per year, but the amount of machine service available to Soviet agriculture should be sufficient if it were used efficiently.

Some Soviet analysts now acknowledge that many resources are scarce, and that their supply comes at costs which are rising steadily (*neuklonno*).⁹ It is freely admitted that the land base is limited and that only minor additions to agricultural area can be expected, that cropland per person will continue to decline, and that labor will become scarcer in the medium term.

⁶Michael D. Zahn, "Soviet Livestock Feed in Perspective," in *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*. A compendium of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, vol. 2, October 10, 1979 (96th Congress, 1st session, Joint Committee Print), pp. 165-185.

⁷For a recent assessment, see Karl-Eugen Wädekin, "Soviet Agriculture's Dependence on the West," in *Foreign Affairs*, spring, 1982, pp. 882-903.

⁸*Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, no. 25, June, 1982, p. 8.

⁹"Tsentral' naya problema pyatiletka," in *Vestnik sel'skokhozyaystvennykh nauk*, no. 1, January, 1982, pp. 1-5.

The goal of capital development is said to be not merely more machines and chemicals, but also qualitatively improved systems of both.¹⁰ The technical literature still points toward larger and larger models of many machines.¹¹

COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATION AND INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVE

The organization of Soviet agriculture on giant "farms" reflects the assumption that socialist people will be motivated to do their best. In agriculture, collective work organization has met great difficulties both because of the biological nature of crop and animal production, which demands more individual interest, and because of the escape hatch into individual farm production.

Individual incentives in agriculture are a recurrent theme in recent Soviet literature. The giant farms are bookkeeping headquarters rather than operating units, but the "brigades" and other subunits within the "farms" are large and render individual incentive difficult. The new drive toward incentive pay often focuses on smaller work groups within the brigades, the "links" (*zveno*, pl. *zven'ya*). These links may have anywhere from two to over a dozen workers, usually from related families. Attempts at making such small work groups into semi-independent units reporting directly to the bookkeeping center of the "farm" were made here and there in the years around 1960, but then met resistance from party bureaucrats as not sufficiently socialist. Recently, the system of operationally semi-independent links has spread, and there are districts where they begin to be a dominant feature. This kind of link is now often extolled as a progressive form of operation, beneficial to the care of the land: "the link is the master of the field" (*zveno-polya khozyain*).¹² "Every hectare of cropland . . . has its master (*khozyain*)." Countervailing voices, trying to reaffirm the brigades, are also heard, but they speak less vigorously than in earlier polemic.¹³

The spread of the semi-independent link may have a second motive. In parts of Russia and other Soviet republics in Europe, there is a shortage of agricultural labor—shortage, that is, in relation to the wasteful over-organization of the brigade system. The overall work force total in Soviet agriculture goes down only slowly, but this masks regional disparities. The Asian

republics, with their still very prolific Muslim populations, show continued increase in their agricultural population. The demographic situation in many European areas is also influenced by the "secondary echo" of the war in the form of low birthrates from the generations reduced in numbers because of the war.¹⁴ It might seem that, under communism, the transfer of a labor surplus from Uzbekistan to shortage areas in Russia would be an obvious solution. None of this appears to be in the making—nationalism is alive and well in the Soviet Union and the land is too emotional a possession to hand over to a different people.

The incipient transition to semi-independent links means a degree of convergence with the West; such a link resembles a two-family farm in the United States. That this might be the outcome of an eventual thinning out of the agricultural population was suggested more than a decade and a half ago.¹⁵ Whether the trend will run its course depends on political decisions that cannot be predicted. This could happen relatively soon in European areas, leaving Muslim Asian republics in a more traditional Communist mold, lending one more feature to the already embarrassing contrast in inherited cultural patterns.

PRIVATE PLOTS AND "SECOND AGRICULTURE"

Private plots for *kolkhoz* members and *sovkhoz* workers are of long standing, and so are similar plots for urban workers. This "private" sector is known to turn out a surprisingly large part of all agricultural production in the U.S.S.R. In the case of animal products it is, however, incorrect to relate all annual production to the small land area of the plots. Animal husbandry on family plots to a large extent uses feed obtained from collective fields; thus it represents a feedlot operation, widely scattered.

The system of family plots has shown impressive vitality over the years, despite the fact that official policy is often against it. In recent years it has gained more official support. Thus, the statistical report on the economy in 1981 notes that private plot agriculture made progress in 1981, in contrast to Soviet agriculture as a whole. The report also notes that there is an increasing practice of feeding state and collective farm

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¹⁰A. Zdorovtsov, "Resursy sel'skogo khozyaystva," in *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaystva*, no. 11, November, 1981, pp. 3–6.

¹¹Thus, *Traktory i sel'khoz mashiny*, e.g., no. 1, 1981, pp. 3–6, 22–24.

¹²*Sel'skaya zhizn'*, February 4 and May 28, 1982; *Zemledelie*, no. 1, January, 1982, pp. 28–31.

¹³Thus for instance, *Traktory i sel'khoz mashiny*, no. 11, 1981, pp. 1–3.

¹⁴A. Zdorovtsov, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

¹⁵Folke Dovring, "Soviet Farm Mechanization in Perspective," *Slavic Review*, vol. 25, no. 2 (June 1966), p. 299.

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"While the Soviet Muslim population has enjoyed great success in basic social development including dramatic improvements in literacy and living conditions, it still lags behind most Soviet standards of modernization."

The Muslims of the Soviet Union

BY ROSEMARIE CRISOSTOMO

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SINCE the Soviet Union was founded, the Soviet Muslim population has experienced prodigious economic and social development.* Behind the facade of modernization, however, Soviet Muslims remain strongly influenced by the rich culture and traditions of their distinctive past. This distinctiveness has commanded the increasing attention of the Soviet leadership as the Muslim proportion of the total Soviet population rises.

Between 1970 and 1979, the Soviet Muslim population grew at a rate more than two and a half times the national average. This shift in the demographic composition of the Soviet Union has important ramifications in the economic, military, social and political life of Soviet society. Growth rates between Soviet Muslims and non-Muslims differ so much that by the year 2000 Soviet Muslims will comprise well over one-fourth of the total Soviet population, nearly one-third of all Soviet military recruits, and almost the entire net increase in the working age population.¹

The Soviet Union has the sixth largest Muslim population in the world. In this context, "Muslim" is used in a cultural rather than a devoutly religious sense. The 45 million Soviet Muslims include approximately 40 nationalities who live mainly in the six Soviet Republics along the U.S.S.R.'s southern tier bordering Iran, Afghanistan and China. The nominal nationalities of these six republics make up the bulk of the Soviet Muslim population and include the Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Turkmen and Azerbaydzhanis. Soviet Muslims are characterized by relatively high fertility and infant mortality rates; low levels of urbanization, migration, and vocational-technical skills; rarity of divorce; and a strong sense of ethnic identity.

Overall population growth rates in the Soviet Union

*The views expressed in this article are the views of the author and do not represent the opinion of the United States Census Bureau or the United States Department of Commerce.

¹Figures in this article come either from official Soviet statistics or unpublished 1982 estimates and projections by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, United States Bureau of the Census.

²The total fertility rate is the average number of children that would be born to each woman in a population if she were to live through her childbearing lifetime.

are falling, but there are enormous regional differences, particularly between the Soviet European population in the north and the predominantly Muslim population in the south. For example, between 1970 and 1979, the Uzbek population (which makes up 30 percent of all Soviet Muslims) grew at a rate five and one-half times that of the Russian population. By the year 2000, two-thirds of the total net increase in the Soviet population will come from Muslim areas, and the Muslim share of the total Soviet population will increase from 17 percent in 1979 to approximately 25 percent in 2000.

While the fertility rate² of many Soviet European nationalities has fallen below replacement level, fertility among Soviet Muslims continues at relatively high levels. For example, in 1979-1980, the total fertility rate for Uzbekistan was 4.9 compared to 1.9 for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). Reasons for this disparity include differences in levels of urbanization, education, divorce, the labor force participation of women, and the strength of culture, particularly religion. All these factors are also related to the larger family size in Muslim areas. In 1979, 32 percent of the families in Uzbekistan had seven or more members compared to 2 percent in the R.S.F.S.R.

Although general mortality rates in Muslim areas are lower than those in other areas, infant mortality appears to be substantially higher. This problem stems from several factors, including the large number of births occurring at home, poor nutrition, the unavailability of adequate baby formula, and problems with water quality and the health care delivery system in rural areas. Because a larger share of the births occur in Muslim areas, the pressure on the health care system is growing. Continued high levels of infant mortality are a serious sign of the health care system's inability to cope with the burgeoning population in these areas.

Levels of urbanization and migration are low relative to the rest of the Soviet population. In 1970, the last year for which data on urban/rural distribution by nationality is available, the Soviet Muslim population was approximately 72 percent rural, and most evidence indicates that this is still the case. The large size

of Muslim families, cramped housing in urban areas, and lack of economic incentives to leave rural areas are among the factors responsible for the Muslim population's preference for rural living. These same factors also influence the Muslim population's low levels of migration to other areas of the Soviet Union. Soviet Muslims, particularly Central Asians, are reluctant to leave their native homelands, where they enjoy a homogeneous, familiar cultural environment, good weather, and greater access to consumer goods through extensive private and black markets. In addition, Soviet Europeans are migrating out of the southern tier, which leads to a greater concentration of indigenous nationalities in the area.

The Soviet Muslim population is also marked by a strong sense of ethnic identity, evidenced by the almost complete retention of native languages, the rarity of ethnically mixed marriages, and the continued attachment to ethnic food, dress and culture. Although ethnic identity is more closely related to nationality than to religious affiliation, the various Soviet Muslim nationalities share a common cultural heritage and body of tradition, and they generally follow Islamic customs related to life cycle events, like death and marriage.

ECONOMIC POLICY

The most serious economic implications of the Soviet Union's changing demographic composition concern the distribution and skill levels of the working age population. Since the results of the 1970 Soviet population census appeared, Soviet economic planners have become increasingly aware of both the absolute decrease in the working age populations of the industrialized European regions and the growing locational imbalance in the total working age population. The annual increase in the total working age population in the 1980's will be only one-fourth of the 1970's increase. In addition, the entire net increase in the working age population will come from the predominantly Muslim southern tier, where the local population's levels of vocational-technical skills, industrialization and migration are relatively low. Thus, demographic trends are leading, on the one hand, to a labor deficit in the Soviet Union's European, Siberian and Far Eastern areas, where crucial industrial, food, energy and resource projects are located, and, on the other hand, to a labor surplus in the non-industrialized Muslim areas, particularly Central Asia, where the indigenous population already has the highest rate of unemployment in social production in the country.

Because of the indigenous population's reluctance to migrate either to urban areas or to labor-deficit regions of the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership must carefully weigh alternative solutions, all involving serious political and economic costs. Economic planners are considering one alternative that would involve building up the southern tier's industrial capacity, par-

ticularly labor-intensive light industry to absorb the area's growing labor surplus, at the same time increasing the quality and quantity of vocational-technical training. This alternative would require a substantial increase in already heavily subsidized capital investment in the area. The additional capital must come either from a reorganization of investment priorities within the area or from investment in other projects elsewhere such as crucial food and energy projects in the R.S.F.S.R. and Siberia. The plan would also require costly improvements in transportation facilities both for the movement of industrial materials and equipment and for indigenous labor to travel from rural homes to the workplace. Other problems include the reluctance of the local Muslim population to engage in industrial work despite incentives like preferential hiring, and the inefficient use of the small portion of the indigenous labor force that is skilled. Evidence indicates that many indigenous skilled workers take jobs that do not require skilled labor.

Another alternative would involve administrative mobilization and the relocation of the southern tier's surplus labor. This mobilization could take three forms: forced relocation, enforcement of the service requirement for higher and specialized secondary educational institute graduates, and increased relocation incentives. The forced relocation of the Muslim working age population is unlikely, because the political and economic costs would be high; therefore such a measure would probably prove counterproductive in the end.

A more feasible form of administrative mobilization would be the more widespread and stricter use of the three-year service requirement of graduates from higher and specialized secondary educational institutions. Soviet officials could send graduates from Muslim areas to serve in labor-deficit areas in the north. This plan, however, would discourage local students from going into higher and secondary specialized education, and this would counter long-term Soviet efforts to raise the indigenous population's educational levels. Also, evidence indicates that many graduates do not show up at their assigned jobs even within their own republics, and many find ways to avoid their commitments.

The third form of administrative mobilization, increased economic incentives, includes pay bonuses, preferred housing, and other benefits. But these incentives include intensifying already strong inflationary pressures on the economy and depleting the low supply of skilled workers rather than the surplus agricultural labor from Muslim areas. Nor would these particular incentives be sufficient to draw indigenous labor into an alien environment. Higher pay and preferential housing mean little when they are weighed against a Soviet Muslim's greater access to consumer goods, a homogenous cultural environment, better

weather, and more satisfactory living conditions in his native homeland.

Thus, the difficulties connected with mobilizing and effectively employing the Soviet labor force have serious consequences for the future of planned Soviet economic development, particularly in the next two decades. Soviet leaders are trying to alleviate these problems by improving labor productivity and embarking on a massive program to import labor-saving technology from the West. However, they have fallen far behind their plans for improving labor productivity and seem to have many problems implementing newly imported technology.

MILITARY POLICY

Soviet Muslims will continue to comprise a larger share of the Soviet military force; by the year 2000, approximately one out of every three Soviet military recruits will be Muslim. In the past, Soviet Muslim military personnel have generally been assigned to construction, support, and rear service troops where their lack of Russian language and technical skills present relatively few problems. However, as Muslim participation in the Soviet military increases and the military system becomes more modernized and technically sophisticated, the Soviet leadership must find ways to integrate Muslims into other areas of the armed forces.

Racial tensions between Soviet Europeans and Muslims seem to be strong in the Soviet armed forces and this contributes to the overall problems involved in effectively integrating Muslims into military life. Experiencing active or passive forms of racial discrimination tends to enhance one's ethnic identity. Therefore, many Soviet Muslims may return to their homes with a heightened sense of ethnic awareness and more antagonistic feelings toward non-Muslim nationalities, particularly Russians.

The low level of Russian language proficiency is one of the major problems the Soviet Muslims face in the Soviet military. Lack of Russian language competence affects their ability to understand commands, learn military regulations, acquire technical specialties and pass tests to handle various types of military equipment. Although there is no systematic Russian language training in the Soviet military, there are tutoring, conversation circles, and isolated classes.

According to the 1967 law establishing such training, Preinduction Military Training (NVP) should be conducted in Russian. However, complaints in newspapers and journals indicate that NVP is often conducted in local languages in Muslim republics, especially in rural areas. In any case, young people only receive two hours of NVP training a week, and therefore NVP is unlikely to affect the prospective recruits' Russian language proficiency in any significant way. In general, however, Russian language skill among

Soviet Muslims, particularly the younger generations, is improving, and eventually this problem will diminish, though probably not until after 2000.

Another aspect of the increasing number of Soviet Muslims in the military is their use in the event of a military conflict, particularly with a Muslim country. The lessons of the Afghanistan experience are difficult to judge because of the lack of consistent information. Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates certain problems with Muslims bartering Soviet military equipment and supplies, defections to the Afghan side, and refusals to fire on fellow Muslims. At the very least, the experience of Soviet Muslims in Afghanistan has almost certainly heightened their awareness of both the outside world and the Soviet leadership's willingness to suppress other Muslim peoples.

Problems caused by the increasing proportion of Muslims in the Soviet military are not likely to become unmanageable. Historically, Soviet leaders have demonstrated their ability to use less than completely loyal troops. Their skillful use of occasionally hostile Ukrainian and Baltic troops during World War II is a case in point. Still, Soviet Muslims bring unique problems to the Soviet military, and these problems will undoubtedly cause strains as the Soviet leadership strives to modernize and effectively deploy its military power.

SOCIAL POLICY

Socially, Soviet Muslims are characterized by their strong ethnic identity, which is reflected in their distinctive cultural patterns. The rarity of ethnically mixed marriages and the very limited social intercourse with non-Muslims outside the workplace attest to the cohesiveness of the Soviet Muslims as a group. Two of the most important cultural factors influencing Soviet Muslim behavior are religion and language. Both factors have far-reaching implications for the integration of Soviet Muslims into the Soviet system.

The behavior of Soviet Muslims is bound up with their unique economic and social development, combined with centuries of tradition canonized by Islam. Islam provides a culture and a way of life for Soviet Muslims, and it affects a whole range of attitudes both spiritual and secular. While it is difficult to gauge the elusive and largely unquantifiable strength of religiosity in Soviet Muslim areas, the more secular manifestations of Islam are apparent. Widely practiced dietary habits, work attitudes, circumcision, and the traditional celebration of life-cycle events illustrate the Islamic influence on the Soviet Muslim way of life.

The persistence of Islam in both its spiritual and secular forms has claimed the increased attention of the Soviet leadership. Soviet officials frequently express concern about the pernicious effects of religion on ideology, and they obviously view Islam as a threat to the Soviet system. The Soviet leadership's awareness

of Islam has undoubtedly grown because of the political manifestations of Islamic fervor in the Soviet Union's southern neighbors, most notably Iran and Afghanistan.

The official institutional framework for Islam in the southern tier includes the Religious Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, headed by the Mufti Ziyauddin ibn Ishan Babakhan. This board entertains foreign diplomats from Islamic countries and publishes a journal entitled *Muslims of the Soviet East*, which touts the religious freedom of Soviet Muslims and is published mainly for foreign consumption. Babakhan and other members of the board tend to toe the official Soviet line even on Iran and Afghanistan. The official Islamic network includes over 1,000 mosques and probably constitutes only a small percentage of the actual places of Islamic prayer and religious celebration.

Soviet leaders have all but admitted the growth of religious influence in Muslim areas. In articles condemning the shortcomings of atheistic work, Soviet officials complain that the number of unregistered mosques and Muslim associations is growing, particularly in the rural areas where most Soviet Muslims reside. Other complaints concern the participation of Communist party and Komsomol members in religious ceremonies, the increased efforts of the Muslim clergy to attract young people to Islam, and the failure to introduce socialist customs as surrogates for traditional religious celebrations. Soviet leaders have tried to replace Islamic rites with newly conceived socialist celebrations centered around the registration of births, marriages, receipt of internal passports and departure for military service. Much to the leadership's dismay, these modern rites are dry, superficial and generally unpopular.

The data from the last two population censuses show that the overwhelming majority of Soviet Muslims still claim the language of their respective nationalities as their native language. Soviet Muslims in the southern tier speak their native languages in their homes, at work, and in the bazaars. Most Soviet Muslim children attend schools where the medium of instruction is the native language. These children can study more advanced subjects in their native languages than their parents could.

However, Soviet Muslims are also learning Russian. Indeed, according to official statistics and reports, Soviet Muslims are embracing Russian as a second language in ever increasing numbers. Since the results of the 1970 Soviet population census indicated that relatively few non-Russians claimed knowledge of Russian, Soviet leaders have embarked on a massive campaign to improve the quality of Russian language

training and to promote bilingualism among Soviet Muslims. The Soviet leadership has expressed hope that the improved knowledge of Russian among Soviet Muslims will increase their geographical and social mobility, military utility, and inclination toward vocational-technical training, and facilitate their integration into Soviet society.

Increased bilingualism is not necessarily tantamount to increased Russification. Growth in the educational and social possibilities of Soviet Muslim native languages has spawned a burgeoning native intelligentsia which, in turn, supports local literature, theater and the arts. Thus, growth in Russian language proficiency among Soviet Muslims is not necessarily occurring at the expense of the native languages.

Knowledge of Russian as a second language is bound to grow as the number of new educational programs, improved textbooks, and better teachers increases. However, the effects of increased Russian language skills on Soviet Muslim behavior are difficult to measure or predict. As long as the Muslim population retains its strong ethnic flavor and remains geographically and socially concentrated, improved Russian language skills will probably not affect traditional Muslim attitudes in the immediate future. Eventually, however, economic, military and political changes in the Soviet Union as a whole are likely to have integrative effects on Muslim society, and greater Russian language proficiency among Muslims will undoubtedly enhance these effects.

Since the 1950's, the Soviet Union has used Soviet Muslims extensively to further cultural, economic and diplomatic relations with third world countries, particularly those with large Muslim populations. Soviet Muslims have served primarily as propaganda and intelligence tools in several ways; thus Soviet Muslims participate in international Islamic conferences, educational exchange programs, and economic development projects. Soviet Muslims also make up a relatively large percentage of the staff members in Soviet embassies and diplomatic missions in Islamic countries.³ The Muslims participating in these foreign projects and programs have obviously been screened for their loyalty and are probably assiduously monitored when they travel beyond Soviet borders.

Soviet leaders often extol the relatively rapid social

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³See Jeremy Azrael, "The 'Nationality Problem' in the USSR: Domestic Pressures and Foreign Policy Constraints," in *The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy*, ed., Seweryn Bialer (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981).

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Noting that "since Stalin's death there has, indeed, been a fundamental change in Soviet conceptions of East-West relations," this Canadian specialist points out that "the fact that Soviet perspectives and policies are not immutably fixed should encourage Western policy-makers to seek a balanced policy which combines firmness aimed at discouraging Soviet adventurism with conciliation designed to foster a climate conducive to the further evolution of Soviet perspectives."

Changing Soviet Conceptions of East-West Relations*

BY PAUL MARANTZ

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TO what extent and in what ways does contemporary Soviet foreign policy differ from that of the Stalin years? This has long been one of the most controversial and vexing questions confronting students of Soviet foreign policy. With the recent deterioration in East-West relations, it has taken on increased practical relevance; for any sound investigation of the origins of détente, of the reasons for its collapse by the late 1970's, and of the implications of this for Western policy in the 1980's must be grounded on a firm sense of just what has and has not changed in the Soviet approach to international politics.

Given the direct policy implications of this debate, it is not surprising that the argument has often been quite spirited.¹ Some analysts believe that present-day Soviet diplomacy differs little from Stalin's, and they argue therefore that the central task of the West is to preserve its strength, act with firmness, and avoid self-defeating illusions about its highly manipulative and tactically adroit enemy. In contrast, others perceive a "learning process" which has resulted in a major evolution in Soviet perspectives on international politics, and on this basis they call for flexible policies designed to encourage and facilitate further changes in the Soviet outlook.

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¹For example, see the exchange between Charles Gati and William Zimmerman in Stephen F. Cohen et al., eds., *The Soviet Union since Stalin* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 279-311.

²The discussion of the Stalinist world view that follows draws on: Frederic S. Burin, "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 57 (June, 1962), pp. 334-354; Elliot R. Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960); Paul Marantz, "Prelude to Detente," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 19 (December, 1975), pp. 501-528; Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), pp. 20-35.

Over the past quarter of a century the West has become so accustomed to fervent Soviet professions of fidelity to peaceful coexistence that it is easy to forget just how sharply the post-Stalin conception of East-West relations diverges from the view that prevailed until 1953. The Stalinist framework for viewing East-West relations was bleak in the extreme, so much so that it is hard to imagine a view that could have been more negative, pessimistic, and fatalistic. The Stalinist world view was based upon a series of mutually reinforcing propositions which all pointed to the same gloomy conclusion: the Soviet Union was confronted by implacable enemies with whom no real cooperation was possible because they were resolutely dedicated to the destruction of the world's first socialist state.²

The distribution of power between East and West was depicted not as one of parity or balance, but as one characterized by capitalist encirclement. The Soviet Union was said to be ringed by hostile states bent upon utilizing every means at their disposal to undermine and weaken it. The need for vigilance was constantly emphasized, based upon the contention that the primary goal of the Soviet regime—ensuring the continued survival of socialism in the Soviet Union—had not been secured and indeed was very much in jeopardy. This view was expressed by the ideological formulation that the "final" victory of socialism—by which was meant the achievement of sufficient security to rule out any possibility of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union—had not been won and could not be attained as long as the capitalist governments of West Europe and North America continued to exist.

Soviet insecurity was further heightened by a deep sense of fatalism in that it was explicitly argued that there was relatively little that the Soviet Union could do to alter the international environment in which it existed. Right to Stalin's last days it was dogmatically asserted that world wars remained an inescapable fea-

ture of international politics under capitalism. Just as World War I had prepared the ground for the Second World War, so World War III would inevitably break out some years hence. Intense strife was the norm, and the interlude between wars was but a temporary lull. Until the day when capitalism ceased to exist in the major Western countries, there was nothing the Soviet Union or its allies could do to alter this unhappy situation.

Arms control and disarmament were specifically rejected as feasible goals for Soviet policy. It was argued that the basic nature of capitalism, which bred a furious struggle for markets and profits, precluded any significant limitations on the means by which that struggle was waged. As long as capitalism held sway in the world, disarmament was a meaningless utopia. From time to time, it might be useful for the Soviet Union to make sweeping proposals for disarmament, but Soviet writings explicitly stated that this was to be done for the sole purpose of exposing the predatory nature of imperialism.

It was for these reasons that, during the Stalin years, Soviet spokesmen depicted international relations as a zero-sum game. In their conception, there were only two players, the socialist camp and capitalist camp, locked in direct conflict. The gains of one side were inevitably losses for the other. Moreover, the stakes of the game were nothing less than one's ultimate survival. *Ktokogo*, who would destroy whom, was constantly being put to the test.

Given this perspective, it clearly made no sense to advocate—as is now so frequently done by Soviet spokesmen—"the relaxation of international tension." Quite the contrary, such a goal was viewed in Stalin's day as a dangerous illusion. Far from advocating the goal of a lessening of international tension, Stalin's main concern was to preserve a high level of tension so that vigilance toward the class enemy would not be relaxed. For Stalin, not unlike some people in the West, a state of détente was vastly more threatening than a state of acute tension, for tension had the advantage of making clear just who was the enemy. There is clear evidence that by the late 1940's some influential Soviet officials were cautiously leaning toward a new, more optimistic conception of international relations. But these impulses to change were decisively stifled.

KHRUSHCHEV: OPTIMISM AND INNOVATION

Stalin's conceptual rigidity is all the more apparent when it is contrasted with the remarkable innovativeness—and even iconoclasm—of his successor Nikita Khrushchev. Within just four years, from 1956 to 1960, Khrushchev decisively transformed Soviet conceptions of East-West relations.

In February 1956, at the twentieth party congress, Khrushchev forthrightly declared that the time-hon-

ored theory of the inevitability of war was no longer valid. In announcing this position, he specifically endorsed many of the arguments that Stalin had rejected just a few years earlier. Khrushchev contended that the growing strength of the socialist camp meant that new opportunities existed for creative diplomacy and for real efforts to prevent the outbreak of war. In 1959, at the twenty-first party congress, Khrushchev carried this new position one step further and provided additional grounds for a more optimistic and open-ended view of the world. He proclaimed that it was fully possible, even while capitalism still existed in the West, to create an international system in which world war would cease to be possible.

A further impetus toward regarding East-West diplomacy in a new light was provided by the repudiation of the traditional Leninist proposition that disarmament was impossible to achieve under capitalism. Khrushchev took the lead in proclaiming that disarmament was a practical, realizable goal. It was argued that only one segment of the ruling elite in capitalist countries had a direct economic stake in military production. Other powerful capitalist groups were said to be harmed by the militarization of the economy, and for this reason their economic self-interest would lead them to oppose an arms race and to join with the Soviet Union in the constructive search for genuine arms control.

Soviet optimism was also reflected in Khrushchev's declaration at the twenty-first congress that capitalist encirclement no longer existed and that the "final" victory of socialism had been achieved in the Soviet Union. This repudiation of Stalinist dogma was more than symbolic. It meant that the survival of the Soviet regime was no longer viewed as hanging in the balance. The Soviet leadership could now approach East-West negotiations with a new feeling of confidence, with a broader agenda of issues in mind, and without a paralyzing fear that they would be manipulated, outmaneuvered, or overwhelmed by a vastly more powerful opponent. A more normal process of diplomatic give-and-take could now be envisaged.

A NEW CONCEPTION

In this context, one of Khrushchev's greatest contributions—one that has often not been sufficiently appreciated in the West—was to provide a fundamentally new basis for the conceptualization of Soviet-American relations. Lenin and Stalin automatically regarded the most powerful imperialist state as the leader of the imperialist forces hostile to the Soviet Union. What was lacking in the traditional view was

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"Searches, arrests and trials, prisons, exile, camps and the psychiatric hospitals form the barbed strands surrounding the loosely integrated . . . human rights movement of the Soviet Union," writes this author, who notes that "despite the repression . . . the light that *A Chronicle of Current Events* sheds on the grim face of the Soviet Union deserves a far wider exposure in the West."

Chronicling Soviet Dissidence

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THE underground journal of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union, *A Chronicle of Current Events*, has circulated information regarding a wide range of Soviet human rights violations since 1968. In Soviet society, those who disagree with the state are considered either traitors subject to punitive labor camps or lunatics committable to psychiatric hospitals for the drug-induced destruction of their personalities. Soviet censorship, paradoxically inherited from the czars, suppresses not only information on military affairs, KGB (secret police) activity, the penal camp system, and so on, but also any bad news that indicates Marxist-Leninist perfection has not yet arrived on earth; for example, vocational diseases, burgeoning chronic alcoholism and drug addiction. In short, as Hedrick Smith stated in *The Russians*, such censorship "cripples independent public discussion of almost any serious issue."¹

No issue could be more serious than the functioning of a necessarily clandestine human rights movement, and its vehicle of information, *A Chronicle of Current Events*, fits into another ancient tradition, *samizdat* or "self-publication," which first appeared under the czars and reached nationwide proportions under their Communist successors. Since Joseph Stalin's death in 1953 relieved the Soviet population of some of their justifiable fears about unexpected arrest, the vast Gulag prison camp system and even outright liquidation, conditions tentatively favorable to the development of a human rights movement began to appear sporadically. Under Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who hoped to secure his political base by playing the role of the Great Reformer, there was a slight relaxation of censorship (1953-1954). In his 1956 "secret speech" to the twentieth Communist party congress, Khrushchev accused Stalin of negligence in pre-World War II planning; and in 1961, Khrushchev denounced his predecessor at the twenty-second party congress, later removing Stalin's remains from the Kremlin. In 1962,

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's exposé of one harsh corner of the bitter land of Gulag, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, was allowed to appear in the periodical *Novy mir*. But each brief "thaw" was greeted by such an outpouring of popular enthusiasm that the Soviet government responded with more stringent controls. In 1954, for example, Aleksandr Tvardovsky, editor of *Novy mir*, was temporarily dismissed for printing literary articles advocating freedom for the artistic imagination. In 1956, after suppressing the Hungarian revolt, the party clamped down severely on imagination at home. In 1962, Khrushchev's fury toward a Moscow exhibition of modern art occasioned yet another "freeze."

After Khrushchev's enforced departure from the government in 1964, Leonid Brezhnev's regime at first allowed a few historical works critical of Stalinist policies. But beginning in 1966, with the ferocious sentences imposed on Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel for publishing pseudonymous works abroad ("*tamizdat*" or "there-published"), rigid censorship was reinstated. Consequently, 1966 also marked a vast upsurge in *samizdat* material, typed at great risk and surreptitiously circulated in chain-letter fashion. *A Chronicle of Current Events* made its first appearance on April 30, 1968, when the Czechoslovak leadership was showing signs of divorcing itself from the Kremlin, causing an international uproar and adding to a proliferation of internal as well as external objections to Soviet policies.

The *Chronicle* was initiated by members of the Soviet civil rights movement, also called in a wider sense the Democratic Movement in the Soviet Union. Its editors, of necessity unnamed, have been among the chief targets of official Soviet harassment over its 11-year history, and its distributors, correspondents and couriers have been subject to arrests and various forms of punishment, including exile. Despite the daunting conditions of its production and distribution, the *Chronicle* has been available to the West for nearly all its history. Peter Reddaway's *Uncensored Russia*² contains the first 11 issues of the *Chronicle*, and Amnesty International published complete English translations beginning with number 16, February, 1971.

¹Hedrick Smith, *The Russians* (New York: Times Books, 1976).

²Peter Reddaway, *Uncensored Russia* (New York: American Heritage Press, 1972).

Although the *Chronicle* was to be bimonthly, its appearances have become less regular. In 1972-1973, in a painful KGB crackdown, as many as 200 intellectuals were interrogated in several cities. The *Chronicle*, however, survived, and its coverage expanded. In 1982, its production schedule has varied from one-month to six-month intervals, and it takes from four to six months for the manuscript to be brought to London, where it is translated and equipped with notes, photographs, index and bibliographical material helpful to Western readers. In all, about six months are usually needed to obtain an English copy of the current *Chronicle*.

At the outset, the *Chronicle* declared that it "does, and will do, its utmost to ensure that its strictly factual style is maintained to the greatest degree possible." Its editors, generally believed to be nonliterary members of the intelligentsia, maintain an objective tone, acknowledging inadequately verified items and correcting published information later proved in error. Today, the *Chronicle* covers most aspects of dissent in the Soviet Union—cultural, social, ethical, national, economic, religious, political, scientific.

Each issue reports searches, arrests, trials and sentences. Under the conveniently inclusive articles 70 and 190-1 of the prevailing Criminal Code, dissenters may receive up to seven years in prison plus up to five years in exile, the latter, according to some former prisoners, more painful than the camps. These articles cover not only "agitation or propaganda" against the state, but also "the manufacture or dissemination in written, printed, or other forms of works of the same content," and "the circulation or preparation or keeping, for the same purpose, of literature of such content." In practice, the KGB may—and does—search and arrest persons suspected of possessing the *Chronicle* itself, other works by "enemies of the state," and religious materials.

All too often issues of the *Chronicle* trace chains of human agony. Such is the case of Viktor Nekipelov. Nekipelov, a pharmacologist, translator and poet born in 1928, was first arrested in 1973 for *samizdat* human rights activities. Since by Soviet definition anyone who protests against the Soviet state must be a lunatic or criminal, Nekipelov spent two months of his two-year prison sentence at the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute, where sane dissenters are "treated" for "paranoid schizophrenia," the favorite diagnosis of dissent, with insulin shock, mind-altering drugs, and capricious

spinal punctures. Released from a strict-regime camp in 1975, Nekipelov became a member of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Committee and wrote a masterful indictment of his sojourn at the Serbsky, *Institute of Fools*, published in the United States in 1980.³

Nekipelov further irritated the Soviet authorities by requesting an emigration permit. While waiting he signed protests against the persecution of human rights activists, particularly Tatiana Velikanova, sentenced in 1979, and defended the rights of the disabled, a group cruelly and inexplicably singled out for special attention by the KGB. According to his son Sergei, Nekipelov began to receive "complete isolation at work, glances in the street, endless searches and threats. . . ."⁴

Chronicle 57 (1980) faithfully recorded Nekipelov's subsequent fate. At his trial June 11-13, 1980, he conducted his own defense: "I consider myself innocent . . . I am 52 years old and a sentence of seven years' imprisonment and five years' exile means for me life imprisonment. . . . The judgment [was] . . . seven years' imprisonment in strict regime camps, followed by five years' exile." Nekipelov's wife was prevented from bringing his last request to the prison: "a plastic mug, a bag and foot-cloths," and on June 24, 1980, Sergei Nekipelov received "an oral warning from the KGB that criminal proceedings were being instituted against him." The possession of Nekipelov's writings continues to incriminate his family and friends, and although the *Chronicle* publishes all known addresses of prisoners and exiles, none has yet appeared for him.

Although the cases of Nekipelov and other more famous human rights activists like Andrei Sakharov are dramatic, the *Chronicle* does not ignore groups whose "crime" lies in their very existence, like the "refuseniks," Jews who while waiting for permission to emigrate to Israel are systematically harassed by official Soviet agencies. Since refuseniks almost always lose their jobs by applying for emigration permits, they are subject to prosecution for "parasitism," a criminal offense in the Soviet Union.⁵

Religious beliefs, illegal in the officially atheistic U.S.S.R., are themselves grounds for persecution. Besides the Jews, the *Chronicle* also observes the regular vilification of other "spiritual emigrés" like ethnic Germans and Pentecostals in official Soviet news media.

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³Viktor Nekipelov, *Institute of Fools: Notes from Serbsky*, trans. by Marco Carynnyk and Martha Horban (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1980).

⁴*A Chronicle of Current Events*, no. 56 (1980).

⁵*Chronicle*, no. 57 (1980) notes the case of two Jewish doctors of science, Leonid Diky and Yury Kolker, who have been accused of being "parasites." Kolker was also threatened by the KGB on April 19, 1980, because of his *samizdat* poetry.

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE SOVIET UNION

THE DIVISION OF EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II: 1946. By *W.W. Rostow*. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981. 212 pages, notes, appendices and index, n.p.)

In his second volume of the "Ideas and Action" series, Walt Rostow focuses on a 1946 American attempt at forestalling the East-West split of Europe. The attempt consisted of a plan to set up a European General Assembly and Security Council to settle economic and security problems for the whole of Europe.

According to Rostow, this plan for a "United States of Europe" (as Churchill called it) might have provided a realistic solution to the Soviet expansion of power. Unfortunately, the plan was never fully presented to President Harry S. Truman, while Secretary of State James Byrnes decided against the proposal and instead pursued piece by piece discussions with the Russians. An analysis of Byrnes's "peripheral" dealings leads Rostow to argue that the political division of Europe and the ensuing cold war "may have been ultimately caused by a United States policy in 1946 that tempted Stalin with visions of a possible extension of Soviet power that no Russian or Communist ruler could, in good conscience, refuse to pursue."

W.W.F.

WITNESSES TO THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR. Edited by *Thomas T. Hammond*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982. 318 pages, notes and index, \$22.50.)

This collection of essays, written by former foreign service officers and military men, is designed to provide "eyewitness" accounts of the beginnings of the cold war in East Europe.

Although Hammond sets the essays in perspective by briefly sketching the polar positions occupied by cold war diplomatic historians (the "traditionalist" and "revisionist" schools), all the essays affirm the traditionalist perspective on the cold war's origin. This leads Hammond (a traditionalist himself) to conclude that "Soviet acts in Eastern Europe and Germany . . . were a major contributing factor, perhaps the main contributing factor, to the start of the cold war."

W.W.F.

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. By *John Lenczowski*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982. 312 pages, notes and index, \$25.00.)

John Lenczowski analyzes the manner in which "the Soviets assess the world balance of power." In this study, he discusses Soviet perceptions of Amer-

ican values and interests, the degree to which the United States will defend these interests, areas of possible conflict with United States interests, and the "Soviet values that determine their assessments."

O.E.S.

CONTEMPORARY SOVIET POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION. 2d edition. By *Donald D. Barry and Carol Barner-Barry*. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1982. 420 pages, appendices, glossary and index, \$10.95, paper.)

The authors have updated the 1978 edition of their work on contemporary Soviet politics and government to provide as clear a guide as possible for the study of the Soviet Union. Of particular interest to a student familiar with American politics is the chapter describing the de-Stalinization process that began in the Soviet Union in 1961, some eight years after Stalin's death in 1953.

The appendix contains the text of the Soviet Constitution adopted in 1977. Each chapter has a selected bibliography as a further aid to the reader.

O.E.S.

THE THIRD WORLD IN SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT. By *Mark N. Katz*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 188 pages, bibliography, notes and index, \$18.50.)

Mark Katz believes that during the Leonid Brezhnev era "Soviet interest and involvement in third world conflicts has evolved into one of the most central and active aspects of Soviet foreign and military policy." He has examined Soviet military literature for changes in military policy and has studied party releases for differences between military policy and party foreign policy, to discover actual foreign policy towards the third world. He gives a detailed account of Soviet involvement since Lenin and Stalin; most of the book is devoted to the Brezhnev period.

The author believes that the Soviet Union has come to recognize the expense and long-term effort needed to maintain Soviet involvement in the third world and maintains that the Soviet Union has found it increasingly difficult to extend its influence there.

O.E.S.

THE SOVIET ART OF WAR: DOCTRINE, STRATEGY, AND TACTICS. Edited By *Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott*. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. 321 pages, bibliography and index, \$26.50, cloth; \$13.00, paper.)

The controversy over nuclear weapons has raised anew the importance of knowing more about Soviet

views on war, conflict and military strategy. This series of statements by leading Soviet military thinkers, ably annotated by the editors, provides a solid introduction to this arcane and difficult subject.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

SOVIET AND AMERICAN INFLUENCE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. By *Marina Ottaway*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. 187 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$24.95.)

A highly respected writer on African affairs has written an informative and interesting account of the superpower rivalry in a strategic part of Africa. The focus is on the past decade and on the issues that have internationalized the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. The book is distinctive and valuable for its comparative analysis.

A.Z.R.

RUSSIA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE 26th CONGRESS OF THE CPSU. Edited by *Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson*. (Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1982. 223 pages and index, \$28.50.)

This collection of excellent essays examines various domestic and foreign policy issues that were discussed at the Soviet Union's Communist party congress in February, 1981. It identifies the key problems faced by the Soviet leadership in agriculture, industrial development, technological innovation, party discipline and performance, and foreign policy; and it evaluates the options available and probable patterns of action.

A.Z.R.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD TURKEY, IRAN, AND AFGHANISTAN: THE DYNAMICS OF INFLUENCE. By *Alvin Z. Rubinstein*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. 200 pages, appendix, selected bibliography, index, \$22.95, cloth; \$11.95, paper.)

This is the first study in more than two decades to analyze Soviet policy toward the three non-Arab Muslim countries situated along its southern border. Focusing on the Kremlin's adaptive and skillful diplomacy under Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, the author examines the relationship between the dramatic internal upheavals in these three countries and the nature of Soviet foreign policy achievements. Students of Soviet affairs, the Middle East, and United States-Soviet rivalry in the third world will find this a useful contribution to an understanding of Soviet policy.

O.E.S.

SOVIET-AMERICAN POLICY: NEW STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTIES

(Continued from page 308)

There is no question that the SS-20's constitute a

significant upgrading of Moscow's European force posture. But to contrast their number blandly with the misleading (although technically correct) statement that Washington has no similar missiles in Western Europe is "not cricket," as the English might say. The SS-20's and the missiles they replaced were after all designed to offset the capabilities of the United States Forward Based Systems of nuclear-capable aircraft assigned to NATO's European command, as well as the air and missile forces of America's allies. Britain and France have "theater-nuclear" forces targeted on the Soviet Union; Britain's Trident system alone was scheduled to carry half as many warheads as the SS-20's, and France's multi-warhead SLBM plans looked more potent still.

A PREFERENCE FOR EXTREMES

The administration's preference for extremes was also reflected in Washington's embrace of Soviet defense budget figures that were considerably higher than those accepted by academic and Allied specialists. The extraordinarily impressive credentials of the critics of United States defense plans, ranging from the most preeminent of nuclear scientists to doyens of past United States security policies like George Kennan and Robert McNamara, might have given the administration pause, but did not.⁸ The case against the need for 17,000 additional warheads, when the United States already possessed over 50 percent of the world's stock of between 50,000 and 60,000 (most of which made the Hiroshima bomb look like a Chinese firecracker) was dismissed. Nuclear scientists who calculated that present arsenals (averaging 30 tons of TNT per man, woman and child on earth) already contained at least 50 times the yield potential needed to destroy society were dismissed. Critiques of limited war scenarios in general and of government war survival prognostications in particular were ignored rather than debated,⁹ although many authorities maintained that the administration had failed to consider the full range of nuclear casualty-inducing agents and effects, and ignored longer-term consequences.

The Reagan administration had apparently persuaded itself that a nuclear war could be won.¹⁰ The United States must hence strive not only to offset any

⁸The United States arms control association newsletter and the spring, 1982, *Foreign Affairs* article coauthored by Kennan and McNamara et al have already been mentioned (footnote 7); for further scientific testimony, see especially *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.

⁹*Ibid.*; and see also Raymond J. Graves, *The Effects of Nuclear War and the Myth of Survivability*, Research Paper #1, Soviet and Strategic Studies Division, CAIS, University of Miami, Miami, Florida, May, 1982.

¹⁰Tom Wicker, "War to the Death," *The New York Times*, June 1, 1982, reports on "the first complete defense guidance" of the Reagan administration. See also the in-depth review by Richard Halloran, in *The New York Times*, May 30, 1982.

possible Soviet advantage in certain areas, but positively to regain past superiority. The administration appeared confident that this goal was achievable, and it proceeded accordingly. Critics were deemed defeatists and/or manipulated by Soviet propaganda organs. Their analyses were thus a priori deemed not worthy of consideration or rebuttal. The possible inaccuracies of the threat presentation were not germane; it was vital that United States military power be augmented, and for this purpose a particular type of threat image was required. The resultant government program was multifaceted, including pursuit of "stealth" bomber designs to thwart Soviet radar, "stealth" cruise missile designs, "SMART" targeting technologies in general, and counterforce intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) guidance prospects (as embodied by the MX). The most startling elements, however, were to be found in government deployment schemes directed at the central European theater and at Moscow's northern sanctuary.

The Pershing II's and their follow-up complement of cruise missiles, both scheduled for European deployment during the first half of the 1980's, were of course presented as a Western "answer" to the SS-20's. It was not just that this justification appeared somewhat specious, in view of the otherwise available composite of offsetting force potentials. More important, there was a qualitative difference of some import. SS-20's could only reach United States allies; the American riposte could reach Moscow and beyond. The American 1963 withdrawal of first generation theater-nuclear missiles from Turkey had been seen as an informal quid pro quo for the Soviet withdrawal of similar missiles from Cuba. It had been presumed that neither power would employ shorter-range missiles in such fashion that they acquired de facto strategic potential. The new United States plans thus appeared to abrogate a 20-year-old understanding. For the systems to be comparable, SS-20's would have had to be stationed in Cuba or Central America, within reach of United States targets. Washington appeared confident that Moscow could be forced to swallow an American

deployment mode the alter ego of which was ruled out by United States fiat.

More startling still was the Reagan administration's procurement of additional nuclear super-carriers, as nuclei for new and exceptionally potent naval strike forces. There was little pretense as to their purpose. It was clear that conceivable third world contingencies could be handled by other existing or evolving means. The new super-carriers made sense in one context only, and it was a context freely admitted by administration policy documents. The administration wanted to develop a capacity to go for the jugular, to strike directly at Soviet home waters, at Moscow's second-strike/withholding sanctuaries.¹¹

The American ambition was in many ways logical for both defensive and offensive reasons. If the fear of Soviet-initiated selective strikes was genuine (never mind that the critical consensus found it farfetched, if not inconceivable), then the ability to threaten all withheld Soviet force elements might well be perceived as the only credible American deterrent. Moscow would clearly not entertain limited nuclear war notions if it could not rely on its reserves. But the offensive rationale appeared more compelling, in view of other evidence of administration confidence and ambition.

NATO's announced willingness to initiate nuclear exchanges if necessary, evolving concepts of flexible response, the Schlesinger Doctrine and Carter's PD 59 all ultimately reflected and still reflect the assurance that the United States technological lead and its warhead and accuracy advantages translate into a military edge of substance. The emerging threat to Moscow's northern waters takes on a different light, however, in view of the Reagan administration's avowed aim to "restore" and confirm American superiority. If United States initiation of nuclear war were to be considered outside the confines of armchair strategists, then the ability to strike simultaneously or at will at Soviet reserves would be pivotal. If that ability could be secured, then MAD would no longer be operative, and there would remain only one superpower.

The constellation of the early 1980's had a number of worrisome arms control implications. In a very real sense, Washington's posture has pulled the rug out from under arms control advocates: strategic arms talks of substance presupposed mutually (if perhaps grudgingly) acknowledged equality. Washington's stance negates the essential premise. In northern waters, Moscow could not afford to place the status quo in jeopardy; Washington appeared bent on upsetting the status quo. Moscow demanded equality; Washington saw no reason to concede it.

Traditional arms control communities were reduced to a state of frustration. The plethora of scientific and military-technological arguments indicating that MAD was an inescapable late twentieth century reality and that contrary tenets were superficially based appeared

¹¹See 1983 *Defense Authorization Act* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982). "The specifics of these (administration) plans are based upon a maritime offensive strategy that emphasizes strikes against enemy forces and their supporting base structure, including strikes in enemy waters against its home territory"; The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, dated April 2, 1982, from which this quote is extracted (emphasis added), goes on to note the widespread criticism: "Critics of this position view the strategy as fundamentally unworkable and likely to provoke Soviet use of nuclear weapons against the (aircraft carrier) battle groups"; the strategy is viewed as "dangerously provocative in a nuclear-armed world and very hazardous to United States carrier forces even if a nuclear exchange is avoided." See also "Pentagon Guidance Document Seeks Tougher Sea Defenses," *Washington Post*, May 25, 1982, and "Big-Ship Advocates Man Battle Stations," *Washington Post*, May 6, 1982.

to find no audience in policymaking circles. So also with the programmed supercarrier task forces; United States submariners' testimony to their vulnerability was brushed aside, as was the 1982 Falkland Islands imbroglio's evidence of surface ship vulnerability to modern missiles (although Soviet potential in this sphere far exceeds that of Argentina's French Exocets).¹²

The frustration was heightened by the informed consensus that an undermining of MAD was not only a futile, foredoomed exercise, but that it was destabilizing and dangerous. History's judgment was that a nation was more likely to resort to war when it was insecure than when it was secure.¹³

By the summer of 1982, critics of United States defense policies, maintaining that administration policies were ideological rather than pragmatic (and were hence impervious to the arguments of pragmatism) and were dangerous to boot, were clearly gaining ground. The European nuclear disarmament campaign had first appeared to find no echo in the American body politic. But the first half of 1982 saw the hitherto absent "nuclear issue" joining inflation and unemployment at the head of public opinion charts. The political urgency thus imparted found expression in congressional nuclear freeze proposals, and even the White House was compelled to show a measure of receptiveness. May brought suggestions that unratified SALT II provisions might be adhered to during the preliminaries for new arms control negotiations. Still, the first substantive strategic arms proposal made by President Reagan appeared designed (in the words of Maine's Edmund Muskie) to suggest a willingness to negotiate, yet to ensure negotiation failure. It reserved bombers and cruise missiles, areas of marked United States advantage. Arms reductions were to focus on missiles only, and especially on land-based rockets (on which Moscow, of course, remained disproportionately dependent).¹⁴

By mid-1982, the contradictions integral to Washington's policy stance had precipitated a crisis in NATO as well. Few if any allied leaders subscribed to Washington's rhetoric about Soviet superiority. Most of the allies were more concerned with the extent of the contrary dynamism that was inherent in Washington's procurement decisions. The offensive bent that colored those decisions and the confidence that they betrayed (a confidence that appeared inherent also in Washington's insistence on Soviet vulnerability to economic sanctions) occasioned as much skepticism as the rhetoric.

¹²See, for example, "Are Big Ships Doomed?" Special Report, *Newsweek*, May 17, 1982; also "Article Critical of Carriers Stamped 'Secret' by Navy," *Washington Post*, May 4, 1982.

¹³R. N. Lebow, "Soviet Incentives for Brinkmanship?" *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May, 1981.

¹⁴See "The Nuclear Era," *op. cit.*, chapter 3.

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President François Mitterrand emerged as forceful and determined spokesmen for the European consensus that trade did not entail unilateral Soviet advantage and that perceptions of undue Soviet benefit were simplistic and superficial. On the other hand, Europeans noted festering Soviet problems in Kabul and Soviet restraint in Poland (in historical terms Moscow's support for Polish Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski was scarcely surprising; the absence of Soviet tanks in Warsaw as of mid-1982, was!), combined with a range of other problems and restraints evident both inside the Soviet Union and among its other client states. Most West Europeans believed that further Soviet territorial aggrandizement schemes would be quickly vetoed in Kremlin policymaking circles.

NATO had been founded on three premises. One, NATO was a strictly defensive alliance of democracies against totalitarianism; two, totalitarianism was perceived to constitute a very real threat; three, the threat could be repulsed and survived. In 1982, all three premises were questioned, probably to a greater extent than ever before. The Reagan administration blamed all the world's terrorism on Moscow. Europe (and even the United States Central Intelligence Agency) noted that there were many terrorist groups with varying aims and that governments other than the Soviet Union employed terrorist tactics. Washington's McCarthyesque picture of rampant Soviet perfidy jarred against a European perception that saw Moscow as less singleminded, less dynamic, less imaginative and, above, all, more defensive and more complex.

In West Europe there was less moral certainty. There were few illusions about Polish events. But the civilian death toll in El Salvador was far greater (with the exception of Thatcher's Britain, all America's NATO allies refused to send observers to that country's recent "election"—all judged it, in effect, analogous to an election in Warsaw). The moral empathy that had cemented NATO had eroded; many members no longer found extreme threat specters to be credible; and more and more members concluded that if threat specters (whether those of tradition or those newly conjured up) were nevertheless substantiated, then no one would survive.

The undermining of NATO of course benefitted Moscow. It also benefitted advocates of American isolationism and those (like United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick) who wished to focus on a North-South American axis or on other non-Atlanticist permutations. Clearly, some other administration members were perturbed by the strength of the adverse reaction to the administration's words and deeds and by the possible consequences.

The summer of 1982 was a period of anticipation. The initiative was Washington's, although choices remained open. Policymakers had been compelled by

public clamor and shifting polls to leave the arms control door ajar. But substantive programs in the strategic arena and elsewhere awaited the resolution of United States policy dynamics. The basic question is whether the administration will decide to revert to MAD, with all its ramifications, or whether it will persist in its contrary embrace of NUTS (nuclear utilization theories) logic. ■

THE SOVIET PIPELINE

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and did turn off the valve. Thus a company run jointly with Romania suspended energy deliveries to Yugoslavia in 1948, when Tito began to demonstrate too much independence. Israel found its contract for petroleum deliveries broken unilaterally by the Soviet Union after the invasion of the Sinai in 1956. Finland's oil flow was halted in 1958 until the Finns found a President more to the Soviet Union's liking. When China's Chairman Mao Zedong began openly to criticize the Soviet Union in 1964, China's oil supplies were cut. And Cuba's supplies were temporarily disrupted in 1968 when it began to criticize Soviet leadership. What the United States wants to prevent is the kind of intimidation applied to the Finns not only in 1958, but in November, 1981, when the Soviet Union again warned the Finns that they should not pick a leader who might be hostile to the Soviet Union.

CONCLUSION

Without doubt, the Soviet Union has energy problems. But for that matter, even members of OPEC have problems. In any event, Soviet leaders have come to recognize that they must exercise greater care in producing and consuming their energy resources. Toward that end, they have finally begun to bring in more advanced Western technology to help them explore for new fields and extract a greater percentage of their petroleum out of the fields. Thus equipped, they have begun to drill offshore in the deeper parts of the Caspian and in the Arctic waters of the Barents Sea. At the same time, they are seeking to master more sophisticated methods of enhanced recovery in an effort to leave less petroleum in the ground. They have also raised the price of energy inside the Soviet Union and increased the pressure on consumers to use Soviet energy more efficiently.

All things considered, when Soviet leaders go to bed at night, more important worries keep them awake: Poland, poor agricultural harvests, Afghanistan, civilian unrest at home, and falling steel and automobile production. Contrary to CIA predictions, one of the few areas of Soviet economic strength is energy, even though various American government agencies warn that the Soviet Union is so energy deficient that it will have to interfere in the Middle East to ensure itself of

adequate energy supplies. At the same time, some of these same government officials worry that the Soviet Union will become a major energy exporter to West Europe and will thereby endanger the economic and political independence of the West European allies. Is the Soviet pipeline half empty and half full at the same time? ■

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE THIRD WORLD

(Continued from page 317)

As the Soviet stake in the international order has increased, its unwillingness to offer a risk-laden challenge to the status quo is reflected in a marked loss of revolutionary fervor. Soviet leaders have long claimed that their chief international duty is not the export of revolution abroad but the building of communism at home. This is not to suggest that the men in the Kremlin are, therefore, completely satisfied with the international order or complacent about the Soviet position in it; nor is it to deny that the Soviet leadership regards itself as locked in a highly competitive relationship with the United States, engaged in a struggle for greater influence in far-flung areas of the globe. Indeed, as Robert Legvold has put it, what we have seen in recent years is a

shift in the Soviet preoccupation from the struggle to secure Soviet power against the external world to a quest for a larger place in it.³

But to say that the Soviet Union is engaged globally in a competition for influence is not at all to conclude that its vital security interests are everywhere involved, much less to assert that some sense of omnipresent threat and possible annihilation is driving the Soviet Union toward world domination. Global involvement has created for the Soviet Union—as for the United States—a far more complex security situation, requiring a more precise assessment of threat and a more careful specification of just which interests are vital to its security. ■

³Robert Legvold, "The Nature of Soviet Power," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1977, pp. 68-69.

THE MUSLIMS OF THE SOVIET UNION

(Continued from page 330)

and economic development of Soviet Muslim republics and promote them as models for third world development. In the past decade, Soviet planners have expanded their economic development projects and cultural exchanges with third world countries. Thousands of third world students are trained in various agricultural, polytechnical and medical institutes in Soviet Muslim areas. Soviet leaders have also sent Soviet Mus-

lims to conduct economic assistance programs in countries like Angola and South Yemen. Several such programs were operating in Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion in 1979, and their number has actually increased since then.

But by most accounts, Soviet efforts to gain influence in third world countries have generally been unsuccessful. While some are impressed by the development of Soviet Muslim areas, most third world countries remain wary of Soviet motives, and few have adopted the Soviet economic development model. Since the mid-1970's, when Soviet involvement in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia intensified, countries in these areas have kept an increasingly anxious and watchful eye on Soviet movements. Continued Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has aggravated this wariness and has elicited strong condemnation from many Islamic countries, including Libya, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The Soviet Union conducts a vigorous propaganda war with China through various communications media, particularly radio broadcasting. Since Soviet Muslims have a relatively higher standard of living and are better treated than their ethnic kinsmen in China, the Soviet Union would seem to have the upper hand in this war of words. Nevertheless, Chinese broadcasts highlighting repressive Soviet behavior toward Muslims may exacerbate anti-Soviet sentiments in the Soviet Union's Muslim republics.

The Soviet Union draws a fine and fragile line between its external and internal views of Islam and nationalist movements. Externally, the Soviet leadership touts the religious freedom of its Muslims, supports various national liberation movements in developing countries, and maintains that Islam and communism can find common ground. Internally, Soviet officials condemn religious practice, try to diffuse nationalist tendencies of the Muslim population, and play down the religious aspects of external events like the Iranian revolution. Because of this paradoxical behavior, Soviet leaders risk intensifying the national consciousness of their own Muslim people. However, Soviet officials closely monitor political activities in Muslim areas, and their awareness of the potential threat of Islam is undoubtedly heightened by the increasing Islamic militancy in countries close to the Soviet border.

In the end, Soviet foreign policy is pragmatic and is governed by the exigencies of the moment. Internal and external pressures arising from the Soviet attitude toward Islam are not likely to precipitate major changes in Soviet foreign policy but will continue to exacerbate other problems the Soviet leadership faces, especially in its attempts to gain influence in the third world.

CONCLUSION

Demographic trends among Soviet Muslims will

continue to play an important role in the economic, social and political dynamics of Soviet society. While the Soviet Muslim population has enjoyed great successes in basic social development, including dramatic improvements in literacy and living conditions, it still lags behind most Soviet standards of modernization. As the proportion of Soviet Muslims in the population increases, differences in language, education, culture and economic behavior will become issues of increasing concern to the Soviet leadership. Tensions caused by these differences are not likely to escalate explosively. Nevertheless, they strain the Soviet system and present complex problems that must be solved if the Soviet Union is to fulfill its overall plans for economic and social development. ■

SOVIET INDUSTRY AND TRADE

(Continued from page 322)

ing technology, whether domestic or imported. However, in particular industries like mineral fertilizers, the impact of Western technology has been significant.¹⁵ Some Western analysts believe that Soviet leaders are now less hopeful that Western technology can rescue their economy; in this view, disillusionment is as important a reason for the trade cutback as the shortage of convertible currencies. There may also be a fear that excessive economic reliance on the West will expose the Soviet Union to Western political pressures. However, others argue that without imports of Western technology to exploit oil, the Soviet Union will experience declining petroleum output in the 1980's, which will impinge on its ability to export oil for hard currency.¹⁶ Continued shortages of hard currency may mean that the Soviet Union will be unable to import the amount of grain and other food products it needs to cover domestic shortages. The Soviet Union has experienced three bad harvests in a row and about half the country's hard currency earnings are now used to import food, as opposed to 18 percent in 1971-1975 and 29 percent in 1979-1980.¹⁷

Thus trade in oil, technology and food are interrelated, presenting Soviet leaders with difficult choices. If they wish to maintain and extend their political and economic domination over East Europe, they may find it imperative to restore petroleum deliveries to previous levels. However, this may force them to accept even lower growth rates, a widening of the technological gap between the Soviet Union and the West, and a deterioration of the Soviet diet.

Given the dilemmas facing the Soviet government, what is a rational policy course for the United States?

¹⁵Eugene Zaleski and Helgard Wienert, *Technology Transfer between East and West* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1980), pp. 24, 215, 302.

¹⁶Bornstein, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

¹⁷Douglas B. Diamond, "Soviet Agricultural Plans for 1981-85," in *Russia at the Crossroads*, p. 119.

The answer depends on what the United States is trying to accomplish. President Reagan's actions have been contradictory. Many of his public statements, the resignation of Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., the lobbying for a reduction of export credits to the Soviet Union at the 1982 Versailles economic conference, and the very tough line the United States has taken on the natural gas pipeline between Siberia and West Europe indicate that United States policy is designed to exacerbate Soviet economic difficulties. On the other hand, President Reagan has lifted the grain embargo and apparently has no intention of reimposing it. This action may indicate a desire to accommodate the Soviet Union. Agricultural exports are at present the only bright spot in United States-Soviet trade; the United States share of Soviet trade is only 1.5 percent today compared to 4 percent in the 1970's.

United States policies are not only contradictory, they are ineffective. The grain embargo did not impose significant costs on the Soviet economy; the Soviet Union was able to increase its imports from countries like Argentina after the embargo was imposed. Similarly, the United States ban on American companies' participation in the natural gas pipeline is expected perhaps to delay the project, but certainly not to kill it. Either the Soviet Union or one of the European companies participating in the project will produce the equipment that will not be supplied by American companies. United States policy, in particular the attempt to forbid European subsidiaries producing components under American licenses to participate in the pipeline project, has angered the European allies and may in fact be illegal.

The use of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union might be effective in persuading the Soviet leaders to negotiate an arms reduction treaty, to exert less pressure on Poland, and to ease emigration policies. The argument for using trade to achieve political aims is strengthened by a United States Commerce Department report to be published in full this fall. According to the report, the Soviet Union's involvement in trade is two to three times greater than had been previously estimated. Soviet imports as a percentage of national income rose from 9 percent in 1970 to 20 percent in 1980.

But Western unity is a prerequisite for effective economic sanctions. If some Western technology and/or credits are going to be denied to the Soviet Union, then the United States, along with its European allies and Japan, must first decide among themselves which technologies are going to be denied and then follow that policy. Given the bad feelings that have recently arisen over unilateral United States actions, as well as economic pressures leading European nations and Japan to cooperate with the Soviet Union in energy development, the prospects for Western unity look dim indeed. This is unfortunate in view of the fact that

Soviet economic problems are serious and that Soviet leaders probably need Western cooperation to solve them. ■

NEW PLANS AND OLD RESULTS FOR SOVIET AGRICULTURE

(Continued from page 326)

livestock on private plots. The food program up to 1990 mandates that every rural household be granted a family plot.

This turnaround in policy points to a realization that socialist agriculture is inefficient. The fact is conceded by the recent growth of a "second agriculture." Industrial, military and other public organizations have begun producing food on nearby land to use in their personnel canteens and for other benefits to their employees.¹⁶ This "auxiliary" agriculture operates with "internal resources," meaning that funds and goods planned for some other use are diverted to local food production. The statistical report on the economy in 1981 also shows increased output from "auxiliary" agriculture; the program up to 1990 recommends support for this kind of agriculture by the deliberate allocation of resources to it.

Both private plots and "auxiliary" agriculture lend a measure of stability to the food system, to balance the vagaries of inefficiency in socialist agriculture. They may also make workers less inclined to migrate, perhaps a mixed blessing.

TARGETS AND POLICY CONFLICTS

The chronic inefficiency of socialist agriculture is compounded by inefficiencies in the rest of the food system. The whole problem area was the subject of a confidential report to the top Soviet leadership last spring.¹⁷ The report apparently detailed a long catalogue of shortcomings and recommended drastic measures to cope with them. Such internal recriminations are not unusual in Soviet politics, and they may be aimed toward a shake-up in the power structure more than toward real changes in the economic system. In any event, many of the measures proposed point in the direction of more localized decision-making and more individual incentives and responsibilities. In one passage, the document appears to have recommended "the Hungarian model" as worth emulating in the Soviet Union.¹⁸

¹⁶Boris Rumer, "The 'Second' Agriculture in the U.S.S.R.," in *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), vol. 33, 1981, pp. 560-571.

¹⁷Dusko Doder, "Soviets Outline Dramatic Farm Deficiencies," *Washington Post*, Sunday, May 23, 1982, pp. 1, 24.

¹⁸The agricultural system of Hungary includes large elements of de facto private enterprise. It is often viewed as satisfactory because it delivers the goods—there are no food shortages and there is some output to spare for export. Less generally noted is the very high level of real costs which make agriculture a heavy burden on the economy in Hungary.

If this was the thrust of the confidential report, not much of it has been included in the food program up to 1990. Its support for auxiliary and private agriculture comes without much emphasis, and "links" and brigades are mentioned side by side as if neither were controversial. Apparently, the struggle between decentralization and continued central control is going to take place "under wraps," with official policy signals weak and hard to interpret.

Considering this internal debate, any prognosis for plan fulfillment would be futile, even leaving the weather aside. The new production plans are far from bold. Many inputs are to be increased far more vigorously than projected output; thus anticipated production responses are weak, and marginal productivity is sharply falling.

Apparently it is not recognized anywhere in the Soviet debate that the country's food problem is a creature of the system itself. The population is not starving; the problem is matching supply and demand. If only prices were realistic in relation to the costs of production, the markets could well be in equilibrium. The continued ambition to deliver the food without overt price inflation and the reliance on bureaucratic official marketing systems form an incongruous syndrome. Increased reliance on private and "auxiliary" agriculture brings to the surface the same tendencies which have long operated in the widespread illegal markets, where many goods besides food are resold at prices far higher than official prices. In the food sector, at least, the socialist system itself is now on trial. The unravelling of the Soviet system of socialized agriculture and food supply and the course of this unravelling will no doubt occasion many more rounds of internal recriminations before a long-term viable system can emerge from the wreckage of centralized socialist agriculture. ■

CHRONICLING SOVIET DISSIDENCE

(Continued from page 334)

Believers who wish to remain in the Soviet Union, frequently persons of advanced age, Orthodox Christians, Adventists, Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses and Catholics, are among the victims.

Beyond the persecution of individuals, the *Chronicle* reveals the overall sweep of Soviet racial injustice. Although the West tends to use the term "Russian" synonymously with "Soviet," there is a vital distinction. "Russian" pertains properly to the language of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) and its nationals; the RSFSR is the dominant "union republic" of the 15 comprising the Soviet Union. "Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics" (ASSR's) are sub-

ordinate to the "union republics" and are named for the minority nationalities that make their homes there, as, for example, the Mordovian ASSR, the home of the Mordovians, subject to the RSFSR. In 1970, 46.6 percent of the total Soviet population belonged to national minorities—Ukrainians, Poles, Baltic peoples, Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijanians from the Caucasus, Turkic peoples, Mongolian peoples, and so forth, each with its own national language, traditions, religious heritage and strong sense of identity. This uneasy conglomeration of nationalities has produced significant internal pressures inside the country as a whole since the violent upheavals of 1905.⁶ The Russian Revolution only theoretically ensured national self-determination. Once the Soviet regime was established, national declarations of independence, as in Estonia, resulted in short-lived national governments followed by bitter civil war and eventual disappearance inside the Soviet monolith.

In the 1980's, several internal circumstances continue to fuel nationalistic tensions in the U.S.S.R.: the monopoly exerted by Russians on important party and government positions; the government's intense effort to impose Russian culture on non-Russian peoples under the guise of disseminating Marxism-Leninism; Moscow's reluctance to fulfill its promises to non-Russian minorities; and increasing numbers of educated and ambitious, but angrily frustrated non-Russian intellectuals. Individual protests against the suppression of nationalities are recorded in the *Chronicle*.⁷

Outright genocide holds a special section in the *Chronicle*. In 1944, according to *Uncensored Russia*, the Crimean Tatars were forcibly deported from their homes under accusations of betraying the motherland. Since all adult men were at the front and older men and youngsters were in the labor units, 200,000 women, children and invalids were moved in closed trucks to central Asia, where they were abandoned. In 1967, the Supreme Soviet legitimized their banishment; if Crimean Tatars attempt to return to their homeland, they must be evicted.

A considerable amount of the *Chronicle's* attention is devoted to affairs in the prisons and camps. Stalin's death in 1953 marked the "rehabilitation" of many "offenders" and cutbacks in both the camp system and the secret police organization; but the prisons are by no means out of business. Political prisoners continue to be sent to prisons like Chistopol, where there was a 15-man hunger strike, although the administration spread "a rumour [sic] that the political prisoners are agents of foreign intelligence service."⁸ Most of the *Chronicle's* recent information on the labor camps comes from the Mordovia and Perm complexes, east of Moscow, although the "Other Prisons and Camps" section reveals addresses spanning the whole of the Gulag Archipelago.⁹

Conditions in the psychiatric hospitals used as spe-

⁶See also the article by Rosemarie Crisostomo in this issue.

⁷See *Chronicle*, nos. 26, 27, 57.

⁸*Chronicle*, no. 55 (1979).

⁹See *Chronicle*, no. 54 (1979).

cialized prisons for dissenters are even more frightening. *Chronicles* 54 through 57 outline the fearful odyssey of Anatoly Lupinos, who had served a ten-year sentence for dissent, leaving him with ulcers, myocardial dystrophy and paralysis of the legs. Lupinos was arrested again May 28, 1970, for reading a poem at a traditional evening honoring the Ukrainian nationalist poet Taras Shevchenko. Although Lupinos's trial was scheduled, it was cancelled upon the appearance of Andrei Sakharov and two other well-known dissenters:

Three days later the court decided to send Lupinos for compulsory treatment in a Special Psychiatric Hospital. . . . He was given haloperidol, trifazin, tizertsin, sulfazin and insulin shock treatment (40 shocks).

Lupinos was subsequently transferred to the Alma-Ata Special Psychiatric Hospital in 1976; then to the Pavlov Psychiatric Hospital, Kiev, and in May, 1979, to the Cherkassy Regional Psychiatric Hospital at Smela. On June 21, 1980, "Lupinos was suddenly taken to Dnepropetrovsk SPH [Special Psychiatric Hospital]—so quickly that the necessary papers were not made out properly and he was returned to Smela," where the *Chronicle* account leaves him in late 1980, after more than ten years, five psychiatric prisons, and inestimable damage to his mental and physical being.

Searches, arrests and trials, prisons, exile, camps and the psychiatric hospitals form the barbed strands surrounding the loosely integrated and almost always nonviolent human rights movement of the Soviet Union. Dissent against the Soviet system generally involves a frail demonstration—a bouquet laid at the wrong grave, a poem recited before the wrong statue or invocations to God rather than to Lenin. Amnesty International, in fact, supports political prisoners' causes only "provided they have neither used nor advocated violence." The Soviet "prisoners of conscience" for the most part seem incapable of violent attacks on their oppressors.

Nonetheless, the dissidents continue to struggle, forcing the government to display more and more repressive tactics. Some observers feel that the human rights movement in the Soviet Union slackened in the late 1970's. However, more recent activities of the dissenters as publicized in the *Chronicle* and elsewhere indicate no slackening in the determination of the human rights movement to achieve some degree of freedom.

Recent outward manifestations of an apparent official relaxation of restrictions on artistic expression in the Soviet Union may be deceptive. Goncharov's *Obolomov*, a current Soviet film developed from a pre-revolutionary classic, in which a "parasite" is treated

sympathetically, and *Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears*, an Academy-Award-winning piece of socialist unreality, as well as exhibitions of tepid nonrepresentational art and even a rock ballet, are probably sops to a populace that may have heard disquieting rumors from Afghanistan and Poland.

More reliable signs of long-term Soviet intentions were the stuffing of prisons with "Olympians" shortly before the 1980 Summer Games and changes in customs regulations to force recipients of packages from overseas to pay more duty than the gifts are worth, usually an impossibility to prisoners and exiles.¹⁰ Whatever superficial improvements in the lot of the Soviet citizenry seem visible to a cursory Western glance are probably as genuine as the roof repairs carried out shortly before the Olympics: "The slates were given only to those whose homes were near the motorway which would be used by visitors to the Olympic Games. They were given only enough slates for the side of the roof facing the road."¹¹

Despite repression, the candle of dissent continues to burn in the Soviet Union. (The symbol on the cover of the *Chronicle* is a candle entangled in barbed wire.) Other *samizdat* publications have taken their light from the *Chronicle*, buoyed by its example of providing an outlet for protest statements, résumés of *samizdat* literature, and photographic evidence of repression and places of imprisonment, as well as verified accounts of individual cases. The light that the *Chronicle* sheds on the grim face of Soviet communism deserves a far wider exposure in the West. Only about 50 American libraries subscribe, although the *Chronicle* offers a primary source of material. But far more significant in terms of human values, the *Chronicle* also provides involvement with what Solzhenitsyn has called "someone else's far-off sorrows or joys . . . the key to a miracle: to overcome man's ruinous habit of learning only from his own experience." ■

CHANGING SOVIET CONCEPTIONS

(Continued from page 332)

any conception suggesting either the possibility or the utility of long-term Soviet cooperation with its most powerful capitalist adversary.

Khrushchev provided this bridge. First of all, it was argued that in the nuclear age the Soviet Union and the United States, as the world's only two superpowers, had a special joint responsibility to work together to avoid a nuclear holocaust and to regulate conflict anywhere in the world.

Second, and more significantly, a new view of foreign policy decision-making within the capitalist countries was developed during the Khrushchev years. Soviet spokesmen, including Khrushchev, embraced the proposition that there were two very different tendencies or groups within the ruling capitalist elite. One was portrayed as bellicose and virulently anti-Soviet,

¹⁰Soviet physicist Mark Azbel estimates the cost to the state of KGB surveillance of important dissenters to be 1,000 rubles per day, "almost a year's salary for an average person."

¹¹*Chronicle*, no. 57 (1980).

while the other was said to be sober, moderate, possessed of a healthy appreciation of the consequences of nuclear war, and sincerely interested in improved relations with the Soviet Union. These two very different factions of the ruling bourgeoisie were locked in a sharp struggle for power, whose precise outcome was an open question. The final result was not preordained and would be decided not just by immutable economic forces, but by the interplay of complex and uncertain political factors as well. There was, according to Khrushchev and his colleagues, a very real possibility that moderate forces would triumph in many of the leading capitalist countries, including even the United States.

This rather unorthodox view had important implications for the Soviet conceptualization of East-West relations. It suggested that there was a real basis for genuine and sincere cooperation even between the Soviet Union, the world's most powerful socialist state, and the United States, the leading force in the imperialist camp. The significance of Khrushchevian innovations was further enhanced by bringing them together in a newly expanded doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The more Khrushchev's conception of peaceful coexistence came under attack (by hard-line elements in the Soviet Union such as Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and by militant parties within the Communist movement such as that of China), the more Khrushchev and his spokesmen expanded and broadened its meaning. It was argued that the avoidance of war (not social revolution) was the central goal of contemporary Soviet foreign policy. Peaceful coexistence was said to consist not merely of the absence of war, but of the establishment of economic, political, and cultural links between East and West, and it was claimed that increasingly the main focus of East-West rivalry was shifting to the arena of peaceful economic competition between the two systems.

In focusing on Khrushchev's innovations and on the ways in which they departed from earlier Soviet conceptions of East-West relations, the positive side of the ledger has been stressed. But these favorable developments were vitiated by the maintenance of ideological elements reflecting a more traditional outlook. Thus throughout Khrushchev's reign, it also remained official orthodoxy that: capitalism is doomed; the Soviet Union has an obligation to promote capitalism's demise; the Communist party alone is the authentic spokesman for the working class; Marxism-Leninism is a science; peaceful coexistence is a form of class struggle; peaceful coexistence precludes military conflict, but not a sharp political, economic, and ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism; ideological coexistence between East and West is impossible; and so forth. Soviet spokesmen remained unwilling to acknowledge openly that Soviet policies might have been partially responsible for the cold war. They at-

tributed changes in Western policies solely to growing Soviet strength which "compelled" these countries to abandon their evil schemes, and they applied a double standard which endorsed Soviet "ideological struggle" against Western policies, but condemned Western criticism of Soviet behavior as impermissible "cold war propaganda."

Some of the traditional elements of Soviet doctrine were no doubt retained simply as part of the ideological baggage necessary to legitimize the Communist party's continued monopoly of political power within the Soviet Union, and thus they need not be taken too seriously. But others were of greater importance, and as long as they remained unaltered, they hindered the improvement of East-West relations. Khrushchev presided over a remarkable amount of ideological and conceptual innovation. Even though the job of refashioning the Soviet world view was far from complete, a promising beginning had been made. A firm foundation upon which to build was bequeathed to his successors.

What, then, has been the response of Leonid Brezhnev and his colleagues to the Khrushchevian legacy? To what extent have official Soviet conceptions of East-West relations continued to evolve and to moderate? The record of the post-1964 period makes it apparent that the forward movement of the Khrushchev years has not continued. On the contrary, there is not just the absence of further conceptual innovation but in some areas an actual retreat. The hopes that many in the West had in the mid-1960's for a gradual de-radicalization of Soviet foreign policy perspectives have been disappointed. However, the circumstances producing this situation are multiple and diverse. There is no single factor at work (for example, one cannot simply speak of a "hardening" of Soviet foreign policy).

On the negative side of the ledger, there has been a complete absence of any further modification of traditional Marxist-Leninist ideological categories in the years since Khrushchev's ouster. Whereas Khrushchev repudiated such concepts as capitalist encirclement, the inevitability of war, and the impossibility of disarmament under capitalism, his successor has not taken any similar steps. There has been a complete disinterest in any further doctrinal change.

Second, there has been not just an absence of further forward movement in regard to the concept of peaceful coexistence, but a definite de-emphasis. Under Khrushchev, peaceful coexistence was frequently defined as the general line of Soviet foreign policy. When the goals of that policy were listed, peaceful coexistence was often ranked ahead of all other priorities. With Khrushchev's departure, there was a distinct change. For the first time, authoritative spokesmen issued stern warnings against giving too much weight to peaceful coexistence, and they cautioned against neglecting the role of other fundamental principles,

especially that of proletarian internationalism. When the goals of Soviet foreign policy were listed in Brezhnev's speeches, peaceful coexistence was generally ranked last, behind such objectives as building communism in the Soviet Union, strengthening the socialist camp, and supporting the forces of national liberation in the third world. Peaceful coexistence was still viewed as combining elements of both competition and cooperation, but under Brezhnev it was given a harder inflection. The side of the equation dealing with "struggle" was clearly stressed.

A third negative development of the Brezhnev period has been the severe downgrading of the importance attached to economic competition. Beginning most prominently at the twenty-first party congress in 1959, Khrushchev increasingly portrayed economic competition between the two systems as the central focus of East-West relations. War, violent revolution, and direct confrontation were all de-emphasized, and it was argued in the strongest possible terms that the Soviet Union was fulfilling its international obligations to the world proletariat by defeating the capitalist world in a battle of economic indices. The claim was made that the Soviet Union, by constantly improving the standard of living of its people and by working to surpass the United States in industrial production, would graphically demonstrate the superiority of socialism and thereby hasten its worldwide victory. Unfortunately, the post-Khrushchev leadership has had no such faith in economic competition. It has been de-emphasized and relegated to a minor place in the Soviet conception of East-West relations.

How, then, should the lack of further conceptual innovation under Brezhnev, the downgrading of peaceful coexistence, and the de-emphasizing of economic competition be evaluated? Clearly the hoped for de-radicalization of Soviet international perspectives has not occurred. It would nevertheless be a mistake to see these developments as constituting some sort of re-radicalization of the Soviet outlook or as signifying a decisive rejection of the Khrushchevian conception of East-West relations.

More than anything else, these developments are a manifestation of those same traits in Brezhnev's political style that are so apparent in most other policy areas in the post-1964 period: a determination to reject Khrushchev's impulsiveness, wishful thinking, and incautious experimentation, and to substitute instead caution, realism, and patient incrementalism. Khrushchev's enthusiasm led to a one-sided emphasis on his panacea of the moment (be it the virgin lands or the improvement of Soviet-American relations) to the det-

rimment of other Soviet interests. The Brezhnev period has been characterized by the pursuit of carefully framed policies which sought to avoid a one-sided thrust in any direction and attempted to address simultaneously a wide range of basic concerns. This, in turn, was coupled with a hard-headed appreciation of the ideological and political costs associated with a too-eager public embrace of peaceful coexistence with the imperialist world.

A major reason, then, for the post-1964 upgrading of the principle of proletarian internationalism and the corresponding downplaying of peaceful coexistence has been the wish to reduce some of these costs (for example, to undercut Chinese and third world charges of Soviet-American collusion and to avoid ideological de-mobilization at home). However, while the prominence of peaceful coexistence in Soviet pronouncements has been reduced somewhat and it has been given a more balanced formulation, peaceful coexistence has certainly not been abandoned. It continues to occupy a highly visible place in Soviet discussions of East-West relations. The Soviets pushed it in the 1972 Soviet-American agreement on "Basic Principle of Relations," and an explicit endorsement of peaceful coexistence is contained in the new Soviet constitution adopted in 1977. Similarly, all the other doctrinal and conceptual innovations introduced by Khrushchev have been retained by the Brezhnev regime.

A second factor influencing the present leadership's conservatism is its awareness of just how successful Khrushchev was in refashioning the Marxist-Leninist world view. He left his successors with a new set of propositions and principles which enables them to conceptualize in their own minds—and to legitimize in the eyes of their followers—a broad range of policies toward the capitalist world. Khrushchev's doctrinal innovations provide them with an ideological *carte blanche* to pursue far-reaching *détente* if they so choose, and hence there is no compelling need—especially when the potential costs are kept in mind—to engage in the further revision of Lenin's legacy.

A third factor contributing to the absence of continuing conceptual innovation is the Brezhnev regime's declining interest in questions of ideology and doctrine. For example, Brezhnev's speeches to the four party congresses over which he has presided have exhibited growing pragmatism and realism. There is a heightened concern with concrete issues and an increased tendency to address East-West relations in terms of the specific interests of the Soviet Union.³ Thus the de-emphasis of the role of economic competition under Brezhnev, which in one sense is a retreat from Khrushchev's position, can be viewed from another perspective simply as a pragmatic response to compelling realities (that is, the Soviet economy's failure to outperform those of the West). Brezhnev's more sober recognition of the complexities of the

³A careful content analysis of Brezhnev's speeches to the twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth party congresses is contained in Franklyn Griffiths, "Ideological Development and Foreign Policy," in Seweryn Bialer, ed., *The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 19-48.

world, the competing considerations that affect any decision, and the constraints on Soviet power can thus be a positive force even if it does lead to a toning down of some of the earlier grandiose claims made on behalf of economic competition and peaceful coexistence.

The general approach of the Brezhnev regime, even at the height of détente, was to proceed with concrete measures to expand political and economic cooperation with the West, but to avoid calling undue attention to this process through sweeping ideological pronouncements. Thus the absence of ideological change is not automatically evidence of rigidity. The prolonged retention of past ideological formulations may be a sign of dogmatism, as was the case under Stalin, or it may be evidence of a declining interest in ideological matters coupled with a realistic recognition of the value of retaining an existing ideological rationale which is now broad enough to allow the unhindered pursuit of a wide range of practical policies.

Related to this is a fourth point: the absence of dramatic change at what might be called the summit of Soviet ideology (that is, formulations concerning the inevitability of war or the final victory of socialism) does not preclude the amending and revision of middle level propositions of much importance. This process, which began under Khrushchev, has clearly continued throughout the post-1964 period. There has been a development in Soviet knowledge and sophistication concerning the processes of foreign policy formulation in the West, the workings of capitalist economies, the role of public opinion and interest groups, and such.⁴ Here the clock has not been set back or stopped. The Soviet perception of its capitalist adversaries has evolved and broadened.

It is true, of course, that greater knowledge of the West facilitates Soviet efforts to influence political developments beyond its frontiers, such as the West European peace movement. But this knowledge also brings home more vividly to the Soviet leadership the costs of particular actions and hence imposes a greater degree of restraint than otherwise might be the case.

Last, in evaluating the receptiveness of the Brezhnev regime to cooperation with the West, account must be taken of the actual policies followed. Despite the recent deterioration of East-West relations, one must not overlook the complex negotiations that were begun in the past 15 years, the number of high-level meetings that have taken place, and the variety of agreements that were worked out. Even more important was Brezhnev's support for a number of policies which would have been inconceivable a few years earlier, such as allowing the emigration of over a quarter of

a million Soviet citizens, vastly expanding the Soviet Union's reliance upon trade with the West, and time and again bowing to Western protests concerning the treatment of specific dissidents or would-be emigrants. Small as these policy changes may seem in the grand scheme of things, they are evidence of a capacity to innovate, and they suggest that in the area of practical policy the Brezhnev regime has been willing to move beyond the confines of past practice.

Several conclusions emerge from this examination of Soviet perspectives on international politics. First, since Stalin's death there has, indeed, been a fundamental change in Soviet conceptions of East-West relations. The Soviet view of international politics has been transformed. Thus the adversary that the West confronts today differs significantly from that of the pre-1953 period. The extent of the change under Khrushchev provides a basis for cautious optimism that some time in the future—perhaps during the post-Brezhnev period—a further evolution of Soviet perspectives may occur.

A second conclusion is that the changes that took place in official Soviet conceptions of East-West relations were not just a matter of abstract ideology. On the contrary, they had very real consequences affecting the nature and texture of relations between the Soviet Union and the West. Without these changes, even the limited progress that has been made would not have taken place, and the degree of tension in times of worsening relations—such as the present—would have been much more severe.

A third and more somber conclusion, however, is that while Soviet conceptual change may have been a necessary condition for lessening the cold war, it clearly has not been sufficient, in and of itself, to bring about a fundamental change in East-West relations. It is unfortunate that as Soviet ideology has receded as a root cause of East-West conflict, new complicating factors have come into play. These include the greatly increased military capabilities of the Soviet Union; the tendency of Brezhnev and his colleagues to attach much more importance to military might than did Khrushchev and to regard military prowess as the one viable substitute for the growing Soviet inability to compete with the West in the realms of economics, politics, or ideology; and the Soviet desire to enjoy all the worldwide prerogatives that it believes its newfound global superpower status should confer upon it.

The times ahead will not be easy. There is abundant fuel for present and future conflicts. However, the fact that Soviet perspectives and policies are not immutably fixed should encourage Western policymakers to seek a balanced policy which combines firmness aimed at discouraging Soviet adventurism with conciliation designed to foster a climate conducive to the further evolution of Soviet perspectives. ■

⁴Alexander Dallin, *The United States in Soviet Perspective*, Adelphi Papers, no. 151 (London, 1979), pp. 13-21; Alexander Dallin, "The Fruits of Interaction," *Survey*, no. 22 (summer/autumn, 1976), pp. 42-46; Jerry F. Hough, "The Evolution in the Soviet World View," *World Politics*, no. 32 (July, 1980), pp. 509-530.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of August, 1982, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arms Reduction

Aug. 12—After 14 sessions, strategic arms reduction negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva, which began on June 30, are temporarily recessed.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Aug. 7—The foreign ministers of the 5 ASEAN nations hold a special session in Bangkok, Thailand, and call for the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia; they also call for free elections in Cambodia under international supervision and support the U.N. seating of the ousted Pol Pot government of Cambodia.

European Economic Community (EEC)

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 12—In Washington, D.C. representatives of the EEC formally protest U.S. President Ronald Reagan's restrictions on the sale of pipeline equipment to the Soviet Union by members of the community; they consider the President's action interference in the affairs of the community.

Iranian-Iraqi War

Aug. 4—The U.S. State Department reports that after 2 weeks of heavy fighting with thousands of casualties, the Iranian-Iraqi War seems to have stalemated. Iran invaded Iraq on July 13.

Aug. 9—Both Iran and Iraq claim heavy enemy casualties in fighting near Basra.

Aug. 15—Iraq's President Saddam Hussein warns that foreign shipping using Iranian ports, including oil installations, are subject to attack by Iraqi planes.

Aug. 30—Iraqi planes bomb Iran's Kharg Island for the third time in two weeks. Iraq has threatened "total destruction of Kharg" if the Iranian shelling of Basra does not stop.

Islamic Conference

Aug. 22—The annual conference begins in Niamey, Niger, with Secretary General Habib Chatti of Tunisia accusing Israel of waging a "war of genocide" in Lebanon.

Aug. 24—Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati demands a pan-Islamic oil embargo against the U.S. because of its support of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

At a subsequent session, Velayati insists that the Muslim nations could solve the Palestinian problem by direct military confrontation with Israel.

Lebanon Crisis

(See also *Intl. U.N.; Israel; Lebanon; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 1—A cease-fire arranged by special U.S. envoy Philip Habib ends a 14-hour bombardment of West Beirut.

Aug. 2—Meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak

Shamir, U.S. President Ronald Reagan tells Shamir to end the escalation of violence and maintain "adequate supplies of food and medicine" for the West Beirut population.

Aug. 4—Israeli forces attack West Beirut with repeated bombing and shelling.

Aug. 7—Egypt and Syria join Jordan and Iraq in agreeing to accept members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) after their withdrawal from West Beirut.

Aug. 8—Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin says Israel has accepted a proposal to allow a multinational peacekeeping force into West Beirut "after most of the terrorists leave Lebanon."

Aug. 9—Israel is formally presented with a peace plan for West Beirut. The plan has been accepted by PLO head Yasir Arafat and by Lebanon.

Aug. 10—Syria announces that it will accept any PLO members who want to go there; Iraq also offers to accept PLO members not wanted in any of the other receiving countries.

Aug. 12—An intensive aerial bombardment of West Beirut by the Israeli air force ends after the U.S. warns Israel it will stop negotiations to remove the PLO from West Beirut if the bombing continues.

Aug. 19—The Israeli Cabinet conditionally accepts U.S. envoy Philip Habib's peace plan for West Beirut.

Aug. 20—The PLO releases two Israeli prisoners, removing the last obstacle to the withdrawal of the PLO from West Beirut.

Aug. 21—350 French paratroopers arrive in West Beirut, the first contingent of a multinational peacekeeping force.

The PLO withdrawal begins as 397 guerrillas leave by ship for Cyprus.

Aug. 25—800 U.S. Marines begin arriving in West Beirut. They will stay in Lebanon for 30 days to monitor the withdrawal of the PLO.

Israeli forces are reportedly being reduced in West Beirut as part of a redeployment of Israeli forces into southern Lebanon.

Aug. 26—The Italian contingent of the multinational peacekeeping force arrives in West Beirut.

Aug. 30—Waving the victory sign to a crowd of supporters, PLO head Yasir Arafat leaves West Beirut for Greece on the Greek cruise ship *Atlantis*; he is expected to settle in Tunisia.

The first 2,000 Syrian troops in West Beirut leave for the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon. In the last 10 days more than 11,000 Syrian and PLO military personnel have withdrawn from West Beirut.

Aug. 31—Israeli jets shoot down an unarmed Syrian reconnaissance plane over Beirut.

It is reported that approximately 12,000 PLO and Syrian troops have withdrawn from West Beirut since August 21; the last 1,000 are expected to leave tomorrow.

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Aug. 5—18 members of the OAU boycott the start of a

4-day meeting of the organization in Tripoli; the meeting fails to start since it lacks a quorum of 34 of the 51 members.

Aug. 8—The OAU meeting is postponed because of the disagreement over the admission of the Polisario Saharan Arab Democratic Republic as a member last February.

United Nations

Aug. 1—The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution calling for a cease-fire in Lebanon and authorizing the Secretary General, upon request of the Lebanese government, to deploy U.N. observers to monitor the cease-fire in Beirut.

Aug. 3—The U.N. Disarmament Committee opens its summer session in Geneva.

Aug. 4—In a 14-0 vote with the U.S. abstaining, the Security Council calls for Israeli forces to withdraw from West Beirut.

Aug. 6—The U.S. vetoes a Security Council resolution aimed at preventing any member nation from supplying arms to Israel; 3 other countries abstain from voting.

Aug. 11—In Geneva, the U.N. Human Rights Committee issues its annual report in which it cites 22 countries for human rights abuse, usually "political disappearances."

Aug. 12—In a unanimous vote, the Security Council again asks Israel to permit U.N. cease-fire observers in Beirut.

Aug. 16—The General Assembly opens an emergency session to consider the possible formation of a Palestinian state.

ANGOLA

Aug. 13—The official Angolan press agency Angop reports that South African troops have driven 125 miles into the country since the July 19 invasion.

Aug. 28—Angop says that 30,000 South African troops are massed near Angola's border with Namibia in preparation for an invasion of Angola.

ARGENTINA

(See also *France*)

Aug. 4—President Reynaldo Bignone announces a new statute calling for the complete reorganization of the country's political parties by September or October, 1983. He says that the elections scheduled for 1983 would be "premature."

Aug. 5—Former junta member General Basilio Lami Dozo resigns from the air force after he is criticized for proposing that the military form a political party.

Aug. 12—The British Navy intercepts three Argentine fishing vessels and orders the boats to leave a restricted zone around the Falkland Islands.

Aug. 13—Approximately 2,000 people attend a rally in Buenos Aires supporting the continuation of the war with the British.

Aug. 24—Economics Minister José María Dagnino Pastore and Domingo Caballo, president of the central bank, resign.

Aug. 25—The government reports that inflation is at an annual rate of 500 percent.

CHILE

Aug. 26—President Augusto Pinochet asks his entire Cabinet to resign; the resignations come at a time of continuing economic deterioration, with unemployment at 21 percent.

Aug. 30—President Pinochet swears in 6 new Cabinet ministers.

CHINA

(See also *U.S.*, *Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 3—The Foreign Ministry warns the U.S. not to grant political asylum to a Chinese tennis star who defected July 20.

Aug. 6—The Communist party announces that a national congress will be held September 1; a new draft constitution for the party will be submitted at that time.

COSTA RICA

Aug. 7—Security Minister Angel Edmundo Solano meets with Nicaragua's Interior Minister. Solano says the two countries have promised to end armed attacks across their shared border.

Aug. 9—Fifteen leaders of a Nicaraguan party in exile are arrested on orders from the National Security Agency.

CUBA

(See also *U.S.*, *Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 30—High-powered radio broadcasts are beamed at the U.S., disrupting U.S. radio. The transmissions may be a Cuban signal to the U.S. not to broadcast into Cuba on Radio Martí, the proposed U.S.-sponsored information station.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Aug. 16—Salvador Jorge Blanco is sworn in as President. Claiming the country is "financially bankrupt," he calls for a freeze on wages and prices, and an increase in some taxes.

EGYPT

Aug. 13—An anti-Israeli demonstration of about 200 people is broken up by police.

Aug. 16—President Hosni Mubarak orders the release of 371 people arrested after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat.

Aug. 22—Writing in *The Washington Post*, President Mubarak says that the U.S. "must recognize the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination"; otherwise, Egypt will find it "most difficult to resume the autonomy talks or revive the peace process."

EIRE

Aug. 16—After meeting with Prime Minister Charles J. Haughey, Attorney General Patrick Connolly resigns. His resignation stems from the arrest of a double-murder suspect in Connolly's apartment on August 13.

EL SALVADOR

Aug. 11—Visiting Washington, D.C., Foreign Minister Fidel Chavez Mena says that there has been a decrease in outside aid to leftist guerrillas.

Aug. 24—The Defense Ministry says 119 guerrillas have been killed by the army in its 5-day sweep of San Vicente province.

Aug. 27—In an interview in Managua, Nicaragua, Rubén Zamora, general secretary of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, says that he and other exiled leftist opposition leaders would return to El Salvador "to work for a political settlement of the war" if the government guaranteed access to the press, the re-

opening of the National University, amnesty for approximately 500 political prisoners and the revocation of legal strictures on labor union activity.

Aug. 28—The U.S. Embassy and the Roman Catholic Church report a large increase in political killings since U.S. certification of human rights progress in the country on July 27.

Aug. 31—The Defense Ministry releases figures showing 3,801 government troop casualties for the 12-month period ending June 30.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Aug. 2—Colonel Teodoro Obiang Nguena is elected to a 7-year term as President by the Supreme Military Council.

ETHIOPIA

(See *Somalia*)

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, Lebanon Crisis; Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 10—The Foreign Ministry announces that "there is no further reason for maintaining the embargo on arms sales to Argentina"; France is the first of the EEC (European Economic Community) countries to end the arms sales embargo imposed during the Falkland Islands War.

Aug. 18—The Cabinet bans the leftist group Direct Action after its leader claims responsibility for three anti-Semitic attacks in Paris.

Aug. 25—The government orders Dresser France, the French subsidiary of Dresser Industries, a U.S. company, to ship 3 compressors to the Soviet Union for use on the natural gas pipeline.

Aug. 26—Dresser France ships the 3 compressors to the Soviet Union.

Corsica

Aug. 8—Elections are held for a regional assembly that will control local spending; this is the first step toward independence from France under a program initiated by French President François Mitterrand.

GERMANY, WEST

Aug. 9—Telefunken, one of Germany's largest corporations, announces it is \$1.84 billion in debt and will go into receivership; this is the largest corporate collapse in Germany since World War II.

GRENADA

Aug. 6—Following a 9-day visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Maurice Bishop announces that the Soviet Union will establish a diplomatic mission in Grenada within 6 weeks.

HONDURAS

Aug. 31—Colonel Leonides Tórres Arias, a senior military official, says that the chief of the Honduran armed forces, General Gustavo Alvarez Martínez, is preparing for a military confrontation with Nicaragua; he calls for Martínez's ouster to stop "his uncontrollable obsession to become the all-powerful man of the country."

INDIA

Aug. 13—After 2 days of talks, senior government of-

ficials offer Pakistan a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation and a nonaggression pact.

Aug. 18—Members of the Bombay police force riot, causing 4 deaths. The army and national guard are brought in to quell the violence.

IRAN

(See also *Intl, Islamic Conference, Iranian-Iraqi War*)

Aug. 14—Former Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh goes on trial for plotting to assassinate the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and to topple the Islamic republic. Ghotbzadeh has pleaded innocent to these charges.

Aug. 16—It is reported that 70 Iranian officers have been executed for taking part in the plot organized by Ghotbzadeh.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Lebanon Crisis, U.N.*)

Aug. 9—Two houses in the occupied West Bank are demolished by Israeli soldiers. The houses belonged to the families of three youths arrested for a firebomb attack on a bus.

Aug. 10—In a statement referring to the terrorist attack on a Jewish restaurant in Paris on August 9, Prime Minister Menachem Begin charges French President François Mitterrand and French news organizations with creating an anti-Semitic atmosphere that helped foster the attack.

Aug. 14—Defense Minister Ariel Sharon says he will not resign because of his failure to consult with Prime Minister Begin before ordering bombing raids in West Beirut.

ITALY

(See also *Intl, Lebanon Crisis*)

Aug. 6—The 7 Socialists in Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini's coalition Cabinet withdraw; the pull-out results from a controversy with the Christian Democrats over their rejection of a plan eliminating tax privileges for oil companies and strengthening penalties for tax evasion by professionals.

Aug. 7—Prime Minister Spadolini's coalition government resigns.

Aug. 23—Prime Minister Spadolini forms a new government composed of the same parties and members as the last government.

KENYA

Aug. 1—An attempted coup led by junior air force officers is reported crushed by forces loyal to President Daniel arap Moi.

Aug. 4—It is reported that the entire air force was placed under arrest following the attempted coup.

Aug. 10—A member of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) reports that 145 people were killed in the August 1 coup attempt.

Aug. 21—The government disbands the air force; a new air force will be organized by Major General Mahamoud Mohamed, deputy commander of the army.

KOREA, NORTH

Aug. 28—The official press agency claims that a U.S. soldier is seeking political asylum after crossing the demilitarized zone into the country.

Aug. 30—The U.N. Command in South Korea asks to meet with Pfc. Joseph T. White, the U.S. soldier, in order to see if he left South Korea voluntarily.

Aug. 31—Korean officials refuse the U.N. request for an interview with White.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Lebanon Crisis, U.N.; Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 23—Christian Phalangist leader Bashir Gemayel is elected President of Lebanon; most Muslim members of Parliament boycott the election.

LIBERIA

Aug. 17—In Washington, D.C., Chairman Samuel K. Doe meets with President Ronald Reagan.

MEXICO

Aug. 12—Following the 2d devaluation of the peso in 6 months on August 5, the government announces the temporary closing of foreign exchange markets.

Aug. 20—After meeting in New York, representatives from more than 100 foreign banks agree to postpone repayment of the country's \$10-billion foreign debt now due, and to provide \$1 billion in new credits.

NICARAGUA

(See also *Costa Rica; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 11—According to the official newspaper *Barricada*, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons and Seventh-Day Adventists are being harassed by government-backed groups.

Aug. 12—*La Prensa*, the only opposition paper in Nicaragua, is shut down for the 3d time in 4 days.

Aug. 14—Energy Minister Emilio Rappaccioli announces that the Soviet Union will provide financial aid for two dams to be built by 1991.

Aug. 16—Two members of a pro-government youth group are killed and seven are wounded in a clash with Roman Catholic high school students.

Aug. 27—Daniel Ortega Saavedra, Coordinator of the Sandinist regime, says that Nicaragua is willing to discuss proposals outlined by the U.S. August 20 on curbing weapons and foreign advisers in Central America.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Aug. 2—Michael Somare is elected Prime Minister.

PAKISTAN

(See also *India*)

Aug. 14—President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq says he will "present the framework of an Islamic system of government before our next Independence Day on August 4, 1983."

PANAMA

Aug. 1—It is reported that following the resignation of President Aristides Royo on July 30, all 10 Cabinet ministers, their undersecretaries, 9 state governors and about 200 diplomats resigned.

Aug. 9—All newspapers are again publishing following their closure on July 30.

PERU

Aug. 22—President Fernando Belaúnde Terry says that the state of emergency declared on August 20 will continue; the suspension of constitutional guarantees followed leftist guerrilla attacks that left Lima without electricity for 48 hours.

PHILIPPINES

Aug. 7—President Ferdinand E. Marcos appoints Imelda, his wife, to a committee that will take over the government in the event of his death or incapacitation.

Aug. 8—Reacting to reports of an alleged plot to conduct a "nationwide strike, which will be accompanied by nationwide bombings and assassinations," President Marcos announces the creation of a new secret police force.

Aug. 14—The president of the National Federation of Labor Unions is arrested on orders from President Marcos; he is charged with plotting to "wreck the economy." 13 labor leaders arrested on August 6 have been released after "character verification."

Aug. 31—Claiming that there will be widespread uprisings on September 1, President Marcos orders one million military reservists on alert; this action follows an August 30 order placing the entire regular armed forces on full combat readiness.

POLAND

Aug. 12—It is reported that 700 people attending a funeral for the daughter of a Solidarity union leader in Szczecin began a pro-Solidarity demonstration that was broken up by police. 20 people were reportedly detained by the authorities.

Aug. 13—Marchers in Gdansk and 3 other cities are dispersed by police in a protest marking 8 months of martial law.

Aug. 16—Police break up a small gathering at the floral cross in Victory Square in Warsaw; 600 were dispersed from the same area in a demonstration held August 13.

General Wojciech Jaruzelski flies to the Soviet Union to talk with President Leonid Brezhnev about unrest in Poland.

Aug. 20—Martial law authorities erect a metal-reinforced wall around Victory Square.

Aug. 21—Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski warns against further demonstrations supporting Solidarity; he says, "The authorities will keep nerves of steel . . . and will use the possibilities open to them by law."

Aug. 26—In an address before 350,000 people in Czeszochowa, the Roman Catholic Primate, Archbishop Josef Glomp, calls for the release of Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and the reinstatement of Solidarity as a legal union; he also asks for calm on both sides during the period of martial law.

Aug. 31—Demonstrators in Warsaw and 4 other cities clash with riot police; the protests mark the 2nd anniversary of Solidarity's birth. Martial law authorities report that two demonstrators were killed in Lubin and that 4,050 people have been arrested.

SEYCHELLES

Aug. 17—Members of the armed forces reportedly seize 239 hostages. They claim they are still loyal to President France Albert René and are not staging a coup.

Aug. 18—The Seychelles press agency reports that the rebellion has been crushed.

SOMALIA

Aug. 11—A Defense Ministry communiqué says that Ethiopian forces suffered 500 casualties in a battle yes-

terday in the Ogaden border region with Somali government troops.

Aug. 15—President Mohamed Siad Barre issues a decree imposing a state of emergency along the border with Ethiopia.

Aug. 26—As part of a \$5.5-million aid package, U.S. military transport planes begin a continuous airlift of weapons and supplies to Somali troops.

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Angola; Zimbabwe*)

Aug. 6—Following their conviction for high treason and murder on August 4, three members of the African National Congress are sentenced to death by the Pretoria Supreme Court.

Aug. 8—Ernest Dipale, a black man held on unspecified charges under the Internal Security Act, is found hanged in his cell; he is the 53d person to die in police custody since 1963.

Aug. 10—Four Ford Motor Co. factories close because of a series of strikes by black workers.

Aug. 14—More than 500 black mourners at the funeral of Ernest Dipale defy a court order prohibiting prayer or song at funerals that might give support to organizations or political parties.

Aug. 26—General Constand Viljoen, head of the South African Defense Force, admits that the three white soldiers killed in Zimbabwe on August 18 were former Rhodesians who were members of his force.

SPAIN

Aug. 27—Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo dissolves Parliament and calls for new elections on October 28.

SWAZILAND

Aug. 21—King Sobhuza II dies; he was the head of state for 82 years.

SYRIA

(See also *Intl, Lebanon Crisis*)

Aug. 1—In a speech at an Army Day celebration, President Hafez Assad charges that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon had "full and unrestricted support" from the U.S.

TURKEY

Aug. 7—Members of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) attack Ankara's airport, killing six and wounding 57.

Aug. 13—It is reported that two Turkish border guards in Cildir were killed by Soviet border guards on August 10. Tass says the two Turks crossed the border and opened fire on the Soviet guards without provocation.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, EEC; France; Grenada; Turkey; United Kingdom; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 2—An American reporter for *Newsweek* is expelled for engaging in "impermissible methods of journalistic activities." The last expulsion of an American reporter occurred in 1977.

Tass reports that President Leonid Brezhnev sent a message to President Ronald Reagan "in which he drew his attention to perfidious actions of Israel,

which again violated the cease-fire agreement and undertook a massive assault on West Beirut."

Aug. 6—Members of the Soviet Union's only independent peace group report that the founder of the group, Sergei Batovrin, has been forcibly placed in a psychiatric hospital.

Aug. 27—Three astronauts, including the second woman to travel in space, land safely after an 8-day mission.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Argentina*)

Aug. 2—The British government orders four companies with contracts to work on the Soviet natural gas pipeline to disregard the ban ordered by President Ronald Reagan.

Aug. 4—Gangs of youths stone policemen in Liverpool; this is the third consecutive day of disturbances in the city.

Aug. 31—In defiance of the U.S. embargo, crews in Glasgow begin loading a Soviet ship with U.S.-designed components for the natural gas pipeline made by John Brown Engineering, Ltd., a British company.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Aug. 4—In Salt Lake City, U.S. district court Judge A. Sherman Christensen orders a new trial in a case involving the Utah sheep ranchers. In 1956, they lost their case against the U.S. for the loss of some 4,000 sheep allegedly killed by nuclear fallout from a U.S. above-ground nuclear test; the judge rules that the "convoluted actions" of the government "perpetrated a fraud upon the court."

Aug. 6—President Reagan names Martin S. Feldstein chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to replace Murray L. Weidenbaum.

Aug. 8—The Census Bureau releases a study showing that 12.6 million children under age 18 (20 percent of the children in the U.S.) live in 1-parent families.

Aug. 9—President Reagan retains former presidential assistant Lyn Nofziger on a temporary assignment to aid in stimulating public support for the proposed \$98.5-billion tax-increase bill.

Aug. 17—In Roanoke, Virginia, Enton Eller is sentenced by a U.S. district court judge to 3 years' probation for failing to register for the draft.

Civil Rights

Aug. 4—The National Urban League concludes its 72d annual conference in Los Angeles and urges the delegates to press for job training programs administered by the government and industry.

Economy

Aug. 5—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit for the 2d quarter of 1982 was \$5.1 billion.

Aug. 6—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate rose to 9.8 percent in July, a postwar record.

Aug. 13—The Labor Department reports that the producer price index rose 0.6 percent in July.

Aug. 19—The Commerce Department reports that the

gross national product for the 2d quarter grew at an annual rate of 1.3 percent.

Aug. 20—Several major banks drop their prime lending rate to 13.5 percent; the rate has dropped 3 full percentage points since July, 1982.

Aug. 24—The Labor Department reports that the Consumer Price Index for July increased only 0.6 percent.

Aug. 26—Volume on the New York Stock Exchange exceeds a record 100 million shares for the 4th straight session.

The Federal Reserve Board drops its discount loan rate to 10 percent.

Aug. 31—The Exchange closes with the Dow Jones industrial average at 901.31, the highest average since August 25, 1981.

The Commerce Department reports that the index of leading economic indicators rose 1.3 percent in July.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, EEC, Lebanon Crisis, U.N.; Cuba; Egypt; North Korea; Somalia; United Kingdom*)

Aug. 2—In Tokyo, U.S. and Japanese officials open a week-long conference on U.S.-Japan trade.

Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance James Buckley reports that in the 1972-1982 period, the Soviet Union, the world's top arms merchant, delivered 74,000 major weapons systems to countries around the world; the U.S. delivered only 44,000.

Aug. 6—Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and representatives of the European Economic Community conclude 3 days of meetings in Washington, D.C., with an agreement setting import quotas on European steel sold in the U.S. over the next 3 years; U.S. steel companies reject the agreement.

Aug. 17—After 10 months of negotiations, the United States and China issue a joint communiqué in which the U.S. agrees gradually to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan, with "the full expectation" that China will strive "for a peaceful solution" to the reunification of Taiwan and China.

Aug. 20—President Reagan orders 800 Marines to take part in supervising the withdrawal of the PLO from West Beirut; the President says the Marines will have a "carefully limited noncombatant role."

Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs Thomas O. Enders reveals a new administration policy on Central America that calls for talks with Nicaragua and a "common ceiling" on military advisers from other nations in Central America.

Aug. 26—The Commerce Department places Dresser France, a French subsidiary of a U.S. company, and Creusot-Loire of Paris on a "temporary denial" list, barring them from buying goods and services from the U.S. The action follows Dresser's noncompliance with the U.S. embargo on equipment for the Soviet natural gas pipeline.

Aug. 31—A State Department spokesman says that Cuba's disruption of U.S. radio broadcasts is "unfortunate evidence of continuing Cuban disregard for international agreements and the rule of law."

Secretary of State George P. Shultz and three other administration officials ask President Reagan to ease sanctions against companies violating the U.S. embargo on equipment for the Soviet natural gas pipeline.

Labor and Industry

Aug. 26—Because of thousands of claims rising out of asbestos-caused illnesses, the Manville Corporation, the world's largest asbestos producer, files for bankruptcy.

Legislation

Aug. 4—In a 69-31 vote, the Senate approves a constitutional amendment that would require Congress to adopt a balanced budget in every fiscal year unless the country is at war; a three-fifths vote by both houses could waive the mandate.

Aug. 5—The House votes 204 to 202 for an arms-reduction resolution favored by President Reagan calling for a reduction in strategic forces and then a freeze by the U.S. and the Soviet Union; a resolution calling for an immediate freeze fails to pass.

Aug. 12—The House votes 340 to 58 for a bill withdrawing some 30 million wilderness acres from oil and gas exploration.

Aug. 18—The House votes 243 to 176 and the Senate votes 67 to 32 to approve a bill mandating government spending cuts of \$13.3 billion.

Aug. 19—Voting 226 to 207 in the House and 52 to 47 in the Senate, Congress approves a \$98.3-billion tax bill.

Aug. 20—The Senate passes by voice vote a \$14.1-billion supplemental appropriations bill; the bill was passed by the House August 18 by a vote of 348 to 67. The bill contains \$355 million for President Reagan's Caribbean Basin initiative.

Aug. 28—President Reagan vetoes the \$14.1-billion supplemental appropriations bill, saying, "It provides an unacceptable total of \$918 million in unrequested and unwarranted increases in domestic spending programs."

Political Scandal

Aug. 25—Representative Frederick W. Richmond (D., New York) resigns from Congress after he pleads guilty in federal court to tax evasion, possession of marijuana and making illegal payments in the awarding of a government contract.

Aug. 27—Leroy Williams, the former congressional page who said he had sex with two Congressmen, tells two investigators from the House Ethics Committee that he lied about the incidents. On August 17, the Justice Department said it was dropping its investigation of the charges.

ZIMBABWE


(See also *South Africa*)

Aug. 2—Prime Minister Robert Mugabe meets with Joshua Nkomo, the leader of rebel forces accused of kidnapping six foreign tourists on July 23.

Aug. 5—Prime Minister Mugabe proposes the introduction of one-party rule after the 1985 elections.

Aug. 19—The state radio reports that troops are being sent to the eastern part of the country to stop Mozambique Resistance Movement guerrillas from crossing the border.

Aug. 21—Prime Minister Mugabe claims that three white soldiers killed 18 miles inside the country on August 18 were part of a group of saboteurs sent into Zimbabwe by the government of South Africa. ■



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